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THE
ARGUMENT, *A PRIORI*,
FOR THE
MORAL ATTRIBUTES
OF
G O D.

BY
WILLIAM HONYMAN GILLESPIE,
AUTHOR OF
“THE NECESSARY EXISTENCE OF GOD.”

אֵל אָמַגָּה וְאֵין עַל
צְדִיק וְלֹשֶׁר הָאֵל :

DEUT. xxxii. 4.

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1865.

141. j. 30.



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IN now letting these pages go forth to the world, some explanations are absolutely required, for the sake of the reader; while others will be very expedient, on account of the author.

For the sake of the reader, it must be mentioned, that the present work is but a continuation; a circumstance, indeed, which will become apparent at a glance. This production is no more than the continuation of "The Argument, *a priori*, for the Being and Attributes of A Great First Cause," as it appears in the *Russel* Edition of "The Necessary Existence of God."

Therefore it is that the present treatise on the Moral, which are also the Relative, Attributes, assumes the truth of all the demonstrations, and reasonings generally, which are contained in the predecessor. In fact, it will be next to impossible for the reader to make anything of the present work, except by an unintermittent series of references to the preceding publication, and by constant assumptions of the correctness of the reasonings therein.

For the sake of the author, certain explanations must be made, in order that matters may be set and seen on a right basis. The present treatise is not given to the public because it is a finished and perfect production, but in order that it may, if possible, become such.

In the latter half of last August, the author (having his own reasons) sat down with the view of making the attempt to demonstrate, in the strictest way, the Moral Attributes of God.

Such an attempt—unlike attempts to demonstrate the Being, and certain of the Attributes—had never been made before, or, if made, had certainly failed, since, of a surety, no *a priori* proof of those attributes is familiar to the world. The attempt was, therefore, a most difficult one.†

The author (labouring as he did under serious disadvantages) availed himself of every help he could command, and he used every precaution. Able friends, known to take a deep interest in the subject, were selected as critical assistants; and they were all asked, as, Proposition by Proposition, almost as page by page, the thing passed into types, What think you? Is this demonstrative? Can you detect any flaw in the reasonings here?

The universal answer, as to *all* the Demonstrations, was to the effect that the reasonings were perfect. No flaw could be detected. And as the critics were sufficiently numerous, and the decision was unanimous, the result seemed to point to a conclusion of the perfectness of the proof *a priori* of the Moral and Relative Attributes of God.

I speak of the reasonings only. For, sooth to say, my friendly critics—who were, by the bye, scattered up and down the island—were far from being at one on other points.

† It is true, that Dr Samuel Clarke, in the 12th and last of the Propositions of his celebrated “Demonstration,” endeavours to reach the Moral Attributes: but the great Rector of St James’s deals with the “*Infinite Goodness, Justice, and Truth, and all other Moral Perfections*,” in that one Proposition, and, in a great measure, *in cumulo*. The author of the *Demonstration* does not treat these Moral Attributes as I have done, namely, by making each of them, one by one, in a proper order, the subject of a distinct *a priori* proof, in a Proposition devoted to itself. What that famous author did was, therefore, quite different from that which I have now attempted. My attempt was of a vastly more difficult nature.—I am not seeking to found anything, distinctively, upon my Scholiums, which contain so many *inferences, connecting those Moral Attributes with men, and their deepest and best interests*. The Scholiums are distinct considerations, and in more *senses than one*.

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
v

For instance, the subject of the *style* of the new treatise provoked hostile criticisms from several of my friends;—while others (I acknowledge) lauded the same style to the utmost. Again, some objected greatly to the *Notes*, in part at least. And other faultfindings would come to light if the correspondence were searched. The least which my friends and critics deserved was, that their objections should be weighed, and I hope that I considered them candidly; though, it must be confessed, I did not plead guilty to all that was objected on the score of the style of the new treatise, and the undue inferiority of the *Notes*.

Thus, in submitting this treatise to the public, or at least to certain among the public,—I am (so far as my own intentions go) but seeking to do, on a wider field, what I have done already. I am aiming at a valid *DEMONSTRATION*: and, because I am doing so, I shall be ready to avail myself of the assistance of friend or foe, who will expose a flaw in the reasoning, or an objectionable point in the manner, and who, by so doing, may enable me to make a more rigorous proof, or to remove a defect in the conduct of the piece. I shall, indeed, welcome adverse criticisms, for the use they may be of, as well as friendly notices, for the encouraging aid they may afford.


In writing thus, I do not seek to disarm criticism. Far from it. I invite criticisms, even the most inimical. Indeed, when an author, once in print, courts the attention of the public, the affair is at a stage far too advanced for leaving ground for trust, in timid measures. Any timidity is, by that time, misplaced.

EDINBURGH,
February, 1865.



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THE
ARGUMENT, *A PRIORI*,
FOR THE
MORAL ATTRIBUTES OF GOD.

SCHOLIUM.

§ 1. In place of the words, “The Simple, Sole, Being of Infinity of Expansion and of Duration, who is All-knowing, All-powerful, entirely Free, and completely Happy,” as well as “perfectly Good,” as occurring in the last section of the last Sub-Proposition;^a or in place of any such collection of words; for the future, we shall employ the one term GOD. That is, so often as is desirable.

§ 2. This substitution will be highly advantageous. It will save repetitions of words, in clauses consisting of many words. And 'twill be certainly a great object gained, to prevent the necessity, ever recurring, of using so many words, in cases where each word, or phrase, is simply syncategorematic, or a part only of the complex *term* which forms the *subject* of the proposition. In being able to avoid, in the generality of cases, circumlocutions, apt to become troublesome, reader and author have, in fine, reasons for congratulating each other.

§ 3. There is, too, another consideration. This is not a case of mere substitution of one word for another. It so

Viz. Div. III. Prop. I. Sub-Prop. § 7.

happens, that the great majority of persons, including many of our best etymologists, are of opinion, that the term "God" is tantamount, linguistically speaking, to "The Good *One*."¹ † Then, our demonstration having argumentatively compassed the existence of The Good One; we shall henceforth employ the term in question as being simply equivalent to The Good Being: to wit, that Good Being whose existence the demonstration had attained to; namely, The necessarily existing Simple, Sole, Being of Infinity of Expansion and of Duration; who is All-knowing, All-powerful, entirely Free, completely Happy, and, also, perfectly Good. The term chosen as substitute has, therefore, the great virtue of suitableness.

4. It was of importance to save the circumlocutions, as so many words, long words too, were to be transported along. Besides, the substitute is no arbitrary selection. Last of all, the term in question is, from its established associations in men's minds, admirably adapted for the situation it has been fixed on to fill. That single word is associated with most men's ideas of supreme, absolute Sovereignty over all things, in combination with Complacency, Benevolence, Kindness, &c., &c. It is, in short, a word felt to be worthy of all honour.

§ 5. In fine, in substituting "God," we are in possession of a word expressive of an idea tantamount to the last predicate. The term conveys the great attribute, the latest element, as yet, in the demonstration. Perfect Goodness is necessarily existing: that is, a Being, perfectly Good, necessarily exists: that is, there is necessarily a God.

¹ If the fact, regarding the etymology, be not as I suppose; let the term chosen be—if not by etymology, by hypothesis—equivalent to the whole complex term constituting the subject in such propositions as we have in view. *Ex hypothesi*, let God = *The Good One*.

† See Note to this Scholium.

PROPOSITION II.

God is necessarily True.

PROLEGOMENON I.

§ 1. For the nouns themselves, *The Simple, Sole, Being of Infinity of Expansion and of Duration, who is All-knowing, All-powerful, entirely Free, completely Happy, and perfectly Good*; or for the substitute on which we have fixed;^a or, finally, for the neuter pronoun “it,” as standing for those nouns—not divulsed, of course, from their own adjectives—or so many of them,^b or for the substituted term: the word “He” shall be employed to denote the same thing. Not that there can be an intention to attach any idea of sex to the Being denoted by the more noble pronoun: but the one word will be more suitable than the other. To us, the inhabitants of Great Britain, and, in general, the peoples who speak our English tongue, it is more decorous and reverential to apply the word *He* to the great and good Being in question than any such word as *it*. Such the genius and con-texture of our language.

§ 2. It is to be borne in mind, that we are arrived at a stage in the ratiocination where we have right to so many attributes, and so conspicuous ones; as the *natural* attributes of Immensity and Eternity; the *intellectual* ones (if you will permit me to call them so) of All-knowingness, All-powerfulness, entire Freeness; as well as the *moral* ones of consummate Happiness and perfect Goodness. In fact, we appear to have now an established right to those attributes,

^a *Vide Schol. præced.*

^b *As used, ex. gr., in Div. III. Prop. I. § 3, & Sub-Prop. § 4.*

of which each was, in turn, a predicate to which we proved our claim. Having such right, we may consider our present position as conferring powers and privileges: the title, for example, to use, when we think proper, the abbreviation of a single word, where before we used many words.^a And 'tis but another step in the same free direction to substitute the more noble personal pronoun "He," embracing, of course, the cognate "Himself," in the place of the impersonal pronoun "it," and its cognates. Logically speaking, we may take the higher ground, and, being so privileged, it is becoming that we should do so.

PROLEGOMENON II.

§ 1. Viewed as an affair of language, the proposition, *God is True*, may be taken in one or other of two distinct senses. *First sense*: GOD is True, may be held to mean, that He truly, or in truth, or according to truthfulness, is GOD. So, we say, or may say, "This is the True GOD." Again: "Ye turned to GOD from idols, to serve the Living and True GOD."

§ 2. *Second sense*. GOD is True, may mean that He acts truly, or with trueness, or truth, or truthfulness. In this way, we may say, "Let GOD be True, but every man a liar." Or, "He that hath received His testimony hath set to his seal that GOD is True." Sometimes, these two meanings are strangely blended or confounded together; although they are so different.[†]

§ 3. Of course, it is only in the latter sense, that our Proposition, GOD is True, is to be taken. The other sense has

^a As laid down in preceding Scholium.

[†] See Note to this Prolegomenon.

been well, if only virtually, elaborated, and, 'tis trusted, most successfully established, in the previous portions of this demonstration.

LEMMA I.

§ 1. Now, there is one thing involved in, or rather by, this proposition, which must be considered at the very outset. For we can advance not so much as a single step without the aid of the supposition in view. Although indeed one might (as is so often done in other cases, so far alike) go on arguing on the supposition without ever so much as noticing, by the slightest hint, that such a supposition is necessary: far less, that the author has, in reality, subsumed it in his reasonings.

§ 2. The supposition in question—whether expressed, or only tacitly understood; for it is by no means always necessary that a necessary supposition should be formally expressed—is, that there are *objects* of God's Truth, objects in relation to which God's Truth must be. This becomes very evident on reflection: 'tis a position containing its own evidence within itself. The notion of God's Truth clearly implies that GOD has objects for the manifestation of that truth. Without these, there is palpably no place for the truth. No possibility of its existence. GOD cannot act with truthfulness in relation to——nothing. 'Tis, then, quite plain, that the supposition in question is actually involved in our Proposition.

§ 3. And this being so, the distinction of *absolute* Attributes, and *relative* Attributes, has been therefore introduced, fairly and thoroughly. Now, the distinction between an absolute attribute, and a relative one, lies in this, that the former expresses what GOD is in Himself, or without relation to anything beyond Himself, or His own Essence: while

the latter, or a relative attribute, expresses what GOD is in relation to something which exists besides Himself, and beyond Himself—some creature or other, whether of an angelic nature (if such exist) or creatures such as men.† If one wishes to study instances of the purely absolute Attributes, choice may be made among the predicates of former Propositions in Divisions I. and II. of this demonstration.

§ 4. 'Tis, therefore, quite plain, that in the Proposition, *God is True*, it is involved that there are objects. But it is a totally different consideration of what character the objects are. These may be (or possibly may not be) creatures, that is, Intelligent and Moral creatures; for no one with whom we will have to do will insult mankind by contending that GOD can be considered Truthful in relation simply to mere Animal Natures, destitute of intellectual and moral qualities. And to speak of Truth in relation to the Vegetable World, were lamentably out of the question: while to talk of Truth as manifested to any portion of the Mineral Kingdom, would be to suggest a sheer impossibility, and to mock our understanding by a shameless absurdity.

§ 5. The objects of the Truth in question may possibly not be creatures. Nevertheless, some persons would, doubtless, contend, that the *objects* present to the mind, when we treat of GOD's Truth, must needs be creatures. These persons would assever, None but men, None but men, can be. But 'tis enough to advance in opposition to the tenet, that only creatures can be objects of GOD's Truth, (as well as of His Love,^a) that this tenet *has not yet been demonstrated*.^b

§ 6. There are objects of GOD's Truth; but whether the objects be necessarily conceived to be creatures at all is,

^a See below, Prop. IV. Dem. § 7.

^b See Prop. IV. Schol. II. § 14.

† See Note to this Lemma.

therefore, an open question. A question on which we mean not at all to enter. To do so, would involve the entering upon the subject of the constitution, the internal constitution, as it were, of the Godhead, the subject, in fact, of the Unity, or of the Holy Trinity (which implies the Unity). To investigate which latter subject to its deepest foundations in our minds, is necessarily far removed from our present purpose. It may be noticed, however, that the attempt *has been made* to demonstrate, in the strictest way, the fact of "the holy, blessed, and glorious Trinity," as received by orthodox Christianity. Of course, no opinion is pronounced as to what amount of success has attended the effort alluded to: or, whether, supposing that no demonstration of the Trinity has yet been actually successfully accomplished, a satisfactory demonstration may in course of time be looked for: whether, in fine, such a demonstration be possible in itself.

§ 7. There is, then, to be supposed *the other than GOD*, in proceeding to our demonstration. And in treating of the other than GOD, we shall, for reasons which may be gathered from the preceding sections, cast out of the account all but the intellectual and moral creatures. And, in the next place, our view shall be, for the most part, limited to man. For, should we, in any place, speak of other creatures, *ex. gr.* angels, which "excel in strength," or, in other words, spirits with intellectual and moral natures superior to man's nature; we shall do so as a matter of grace, or of mere hypothesis. We shall do so only for the sake of some illustration, or for the mere purpose of widening the range of our horizon.¹

¹ The sentence in the text may be found to be more applicable to subsequent places, in our demonstration, than to this place.

LEMMA II.

It is involved in this proposition, that GOD is necessarily True; involved in the proposition as what it essentially means;

That GOD acts towards the other than Himself,

- (1.) As if He is what He is, not what He is not.
- (2.) As if the other is what it is, not what it is not.
- (3.) Both relations being, at sametime, preserved.

To state the same thing otherwise:

- (1.) GOD, as GOD, must manifest Himself to Man.^a
- (2.) GOD must manifest Himself to Man as being Man.^a
- (3.) GOD, as GOD, must manifest Himself to Man, as Man.^a

DEMONSTRATION.

§ 1. We come now to the demonstration itself of the truth of our Proposition, *that God is necessarily True*. And to demonstrate this, in the exactest manner, not a great deal will be required to be advanced.

§ 2. To be true, is to act as things are, and not as they are not. 'Tis, in a word, to energize in accordance with the reality.^b Now, to act as a thing is, requires no foreign element: but to act as a thing is not, does obviously require the introduction of a foreign element. GOD,^c in acting as He is, to men as men, goes not beyond the reality of things. But suppose it otherwise: Suppose, to wit, GOD acting as

^a Lemma I. § 7.

^b Lemma II.

^c When this term is used, understand that reference is always, though tacitly, made to the Scholium under the Sub-Proposition, after Proposition I. in this Division.

^d For the justification of the employment of the word "He," see Prolegomenon I. above. This direction must be held to apply to every case of the use of the pronoun.

if He were not what He really is, or as if He were what He really is not; and to men as not being what they are, or as being what they are not;—you thereby necessitate the introduction of a supposition to account for this acting falsely. Obviously, you require something out of GOD, and beyond GOD, to account for His falseness. His acting truly requires no reason—no reason certainly beyond the fact, that GOD is GOD, and men are men. But once say, that GOD acts as if He were not GOD, that is, as if He were un-God-ed; and as if men were no longer men, but un-human; and you have introduced the necessity of the supposition of a foreign element. And what foreign element can there be? Most evidently, there can be none. Out of, or beyond, the necessarily existing Simple, Sole, Being of Infinity of Expansion and of Duration, who is All-knowing, All-powerful, entirely Free, completely Happy, and perfectly Good, what can there be to necessitate His acting falsely? No such foreign element can be assigned, or so much as thought of, by the most unbridled imagination in its very wildest flight. 'Tis plain, there can be no being independent of that Being: None, therefore, to cause Him to energize falsely.

§ 3. But an additional absurdity would be involved by the introduction of the supposition of such foreign element. There is no place for such element—But *on supposition* of it, a fresh absurdity would come into the field. At all events, the absurdity which there unquestionably is, will be presented in a somewhat new light.

§ 4. Falsity, Falseness, Falsehood, of any kind, and of every degree, involves imperfection in the being who is false.¹

¹ At this stage, we must consider Falsity on its mere intellectual side, or simply as opposed to the True, and without taking in the element of morality. 'Tis indeed very hard to be obliged to treat of Falsehood as a mere intellectual quantity. But under the Proposition concerning Justice,

Falseness can only have place in a nature defective in some respect. Now, defect or imperfection cannot be supposed in GOD. What defect or imperfection can there be in that One Necessary Being, of utmost Simplicity, who, being of Infinity of Expansion and Duration, is All-knowing, All-powerful, entirely Free, completely Happy, and perfectly Good ?†

§ 5. In fine, to suppose GOD otherwise than True, that is, as acting falsely, were equal to the absurdity of alleging, that the necessarily un-limited One is, in point of fact, limited : most limited too. For, no limitation can be greater than that defect which would bring about the adoption of falsehood.

§ 6. There is, thus, a sufficient reason for our position, that GOD, in acting, must act as things are. We say, therefore, that GOD is necessarily True.

§ 7. GOD is, then, necessarily *True*.

COROLLARY FROM PROPOSITION II.

God is necessarily Faithful.

LEMMA I.

§ 1. Two presuppositions are implied by this proposition. Or, the proposition, *God is Faithful*, requires a double presupposition.

§ 2. First. Faithfulness demands the positing of *objects*, as well as Truth does.^a

^a Preced. Prop. Lemma I.

we shall be able to have our revenge ; for there the False will appear in its true colours, or as the Im-moral.

† See *Note to this Demonstration.*

LEMMA II.

§ 3. Second. Faithfulness, not only demands *objects*, but itself, as *subject*, necessitates the supposition of a thing, not, like a pure object, beyond itself. For, Faithfulness plainly can only come to be exercised with reference to Promises, Covenants, or Engagements of some kind. And it is not difficult to see that all these are at bottom one. A covenant, an engagement, an obligation of any description whatsoever, come under, or entered into, by GOD, is just a promise in another form. All the rest are resolvable into the first: The whole class contains but one species, Divine Promise.¹

§ 4. As, therefore, there are *relative* attributes; among the relative attributes, this attribute of Faithfulness is by no means the least relative.

DEMONSTRATION.

§ 1. In the proof of the Proposition, no great measure of force will need to be expended. The attribute of Truth being once established, the foundations of the Faithfulness have been laid. Faithfulness, as an attribute, implies not a great deal more than Trueness. Truth is not Faithfulness, but the latter involves the former, and is neither more nor less than an application, a particular application of Truthfulness. To be faithful, is to be something more

¹ Of course, the generalisation accords with the formulæ of Logic. Men of Natural Science use "class" and "species," in another way: but we do not follow the physical philosophers in a meta-physical tractatus. A logician knows (and can know) of only a *species*—generalisation as to all things above,—and a *genus*—generalisation as to all things below. The *genera* and *species* receive, in the different physical or natural sciences, a variety of names, *ex. gr.* "group," "order," "class," &c. &c., owing to the number of divisions of which each of those heads is, for the sake of convenience, made to consist.

than being true, for it is to be true as to engagements contracted. Faithfulness = Truth as to Engagements. Simply so. †

§ 2. As, therefore, 'tis so that Faithfulness holds so directly of Truth, a separate and lengthily drawn out demonstration is by no means necessary: it would not even be expedient, since it would have a tendency to obscure rather than to enlighten farther. If a separate demonstration be not absolutely necessary, such might serve the same sort of ill purpose which some other works of supererogation accomplish: it might give birth to the thought, that a mountain was to be removed, where all is a plain already.

§ 3. A Divine Promise, however, is a serious thing. The Faithfulness of GOD is an attribute which, more than many of the attributes, depends on the other than GOD:^a Nevertheless, the faithfulness in question is the true *heavenly archetype*, or (should you object to such form of words) the real *archetypal ground* of every "*law*," "*which altereth not*." GOD's faithfulness to a promise is the GOD of Truth^b Himself with reference to a promise. A divine promise, once made, is sure, yea unchangeable. A promise by GOD is GOD Himself promising. A divine promise broken, would be GOD un-God-ed. In fine, "it is impossible for God to lie," because it is impossible that GOD should cease to be.

§ 4. We cannot hesitate, therefore, to maintain, that the doctrine of the necessary Faithfulness of GOD is necessarily sound doctrine.

§ 5. GOD is, then, necessarily *Faithful*.

^a See the Lemmas.

^b Proposition II.

† See Note to this Corollary.

PROPOSITION III.

God is necessarily Inflexibly Just.

LEMMA I.

§ 1. If the preceding Proposition demanded a postulate to be previously grounded,^a the present one equally, or much more, makes the same requirement. If to manifest Truth, to do the Truth (as one saith), objects are required; to manifest Justice requires, no less, *objects* on which the Justice is to be exercised.

§ 2. And not to repeat at length considerations advanced under the previous Proposition,^b the objects presented to the Justice must be, or, at any rate, shall be, considered to be *men*. They must be so considered, taking the nature of the lower animals, and all beneath the lower animals, into account. And the objects of the Justice shall be considered to the exclusion of angel-spirits, or any possibly existing higher natures.^c

§ 3. Our Proposition is tantamount, then, to this, that God is Just to Men.

LEMMA II.

And the same sort of thing is involved with regard to Justice, as was involved in the position with regard to Truth.^d Thus, it is here involved that God acts towards those His creatures,

As He is, and as they are.

^a See Div. III. Prop. II. Lemma I.

^b Prop. preced. Lemma I. Sect. 2, 4, &c.

^c Ibid. § 7.

^d Prop. preced. Lemma II.

SCHOLIUM I. (PRÆPOSITUM.)

There is a point which, for the sake of clearness, it will be as well to explain, and it can, with great propriety, be explained in this place. Whereas the word “good” is used several times in the course of the preceding Lemma, (as well as it shall be used frequently elsewhere): it is to be observed, that *goodness* in GOD is one thing; in man, it is another. That is, the word “good,” or “goodness,” when applied to man, has a different meaning from that which the word has when used with reference to GOD. Goodness, as to GOD; or as employed in our Sub-Proposition,^a where the predicate is, being “perfectly Good;” is equal, or as equi-pollent as may be, to the meaning of Benevolence, or Benignity, or Kindness.[†] But *goodness*, as to man—at least, as we have been employing the term “good”—is equal to *virtuousness*, *virtuousness* or *righteousness*, in general: that is, when speaking of man, we have employed the term, as is generally done, to denote more, a great deal more, than simple (human) benevolence, or beneficence.[‡]

DEMONSTRATION.

§ 1. Now come we to the demonstration of the Proposition, *that God is inflexibly Just, and that necessarily*. The demonstration itself may surprise some by its brevity: but there shall be no lack of quality, if of quantity.

§ 2. There can be no sufficient reason why we should suppose the possibility of GOD being unjust. To suppose GOD has need to be unjust, would be to suppose a cause

^a Under Prop. I. Div. III.

[†] See Notes to this Scholium: Note A.

[‡] See Notes to this Scholium: Note B.

without, or apart from, GOD, compelling Him: and 'tis absurd, in the case of GOD, as we have demonstrated His Existence, and so many of His Attributes,^a to suppose a cause, outside Him, determining Him.

§ 3. Besides, nothing more absurd than to suppose GOD to be necessitated, from without, to act as He is not—to be obliged to act as He is not, to men good, and men bad, as being otherwise than they really are. The supposition^{In} question would involve that GOD were not True, but False and Im-moral;—and indeed GOD's Justice is little more than His Trueness applied to the good, and to the bad, as being, respectively, good and bad;—and as the absurdity of GOD's being false has been demonstrated, the absurdity of the supposition which would involve that absurdity is also, at sametime, demonstrated. For GOD to be un-just; that is, acting to the good as if they were bad, and to the bad as if they were good; were to be not True, but False and Im-moral. But this is impossible:^b Therefore, the other is impossible. And as has been already set forth, the simple supposition of GOD's injustice is so absurd in itself, that no position can by any possibility be more absurd.

§ 4. Nothing can be imagined more satisfactory than this demonstration. It is thoroughly convincing; and its brevity can only be adduced as an immense additional virtue.

§ 5. We can have no difficulty, therefore, in arriving at the conclusion, that GOD and Justice stand to each other as necessary inseparables; and so we maintain, that GOD is necessarily of inflexible Justice.

§ 6. GOD is necessarily, then, *inflexibly Just.*

^a See the Propositions in Divisions I. & II.

^b Prop. II.

SCHOLIUM II. (POSTPOSITUM.)

§ 1. 'Tis incumbent upon us now to enter upon another part of our subject. We have noticed a special element which falls to be introduced when treating of Justice,^a and we are arrived at the place where we must take notice of a second additional element, one, too, of the gravest importance. The former element was weighty in one respect: this one will be seen to be so in another. The former went to make up the idea of what Justice implies, or what is Justice: and therefore it behoved to appear *before* the demonstration. But it may perhaps be, that the present element looks more towards the consequences of Justice, than the constitution itself of the idea thereof: and, so, its natural position is *after* the demonstration. Its fit place is in our posterior analytics.

§ 2. We have seen, that the Justice of GOD implies that HE act to the good as good; to the bad, as being really bad. But we now allege, that the good^b man is, as such, naturally happy: he is happy so far as he is good, or as the good which is in him is uninterruptedly operative. Analogously, the bad man, as such, is infallibly unhappy, or, to adopt as plain a word, miserable. Goodness or virtue, in short, implies happiness, and vice implies misery, of a greater or a less degree. GOD, therefore, must act towards the good man as being a happy man, and to the evil man as being a miserable man. And we shall have an opportunity of observing how much, of even awful significance, is involved in these things.^c

§ 3. It is, then, to be shown, that goodness in men involves happiness; and badness, unhappiness. Afterwards,

^a Above, Lemma III.

^b See Scholium above.

^c See below, Schol. III. Sect. 13, 14;—and other places.

we shall attend emphatically to what is implied in God acting to the good or happy man, as being truly a happy man, and to the evil or unhappy man—to be plain with you, the sinner—as being indeed an unhappy, yea a miserable man.^a Not omitting neither the consequences of such action. At the point indicated, the grand doctrine of Rewards and Punishments will break in upon us; and, in self-luminous flashes of light derived from the source of that doctrine, we shall have, at a certain point in our progress, glimpses of the unutterable blessedness of heaven; as well as be obliged to admit within the scope of our gaze (although blasting will be the vision) the lurid “darkness visible” of the horrific damnation of hell. Such the dire necessity of the case.

§ 4. Thus, we are to address ourselves, in the first place, to the doctrine, that virtue involves happiness; and vice, misery.

§ 5. Now, when we say, that the virtuous, or good man is, as such, happy, we mean, that this is so according to the constitution and course of nature, the constitution and course of nature as experienced by us. But goodness is not the only thing or cause in operation, in any case. There is no man thoroughly good, and that continually: and there are other disturbing forces at work besides those flowing from the man himself, directly, or indirectly; voluntarily, or hereditarily. There are other lines, some of them of course traversing lines, besides the main line of life. All those disturbing forces, from whatever quarter, being resolvable into the evil that is in the world. And the consequence of all this, the experienced, and the admitted consequence is, that goodness is not so much productive of, and attended by, happiness simply, as *it tends, always tends, to be so*. Virtue,

^a Below, Schol. III. Sect. 13, 14. Also, Schol. IV. Sect. 16, 17.

so far furth as it is virtue, involves happiness, so far as the virtue is singly operative. This length we must indeed go. But the confusion which there is in the actual world prevents us from being able to go farther. But, let it be believed, that length is quite far enough from being a short way.

§ 6. And, similarly, the same sort of thing holds with regard to the opposite, unvirtuousness. As, according to the constitution of nature, the good man is happy, so, after the same fashion, the vicious man is miserable, more or less miserable, and he always *tends to become so, and more and more*. But no wicked man alive is as evil as it is possible he might have been, or may hereafter come to be; by reason—if for no other reason—of the good, the great good, which there is in this world of sense, with all its deficiencies: The good will not allow the evil to be so evil, as, without the good, the evil would assuredly be. The good is always striving (such is its nature) to keep the evil within bounds, and to lessen, the effects, at least, of its malignity. And the experienced consequence is, that evil, or vice, is not attended by so much misery as it invariably tends to produce. For the same reason—that is, this is the reason—Sin, most prolific mother, does not sooner bring about Death, true, absolute Death. There are counteracting agencies at work, which keep the whole of the dreadful sin-brood in a sort of half-life, or lingering death. It is only when Sin hath conceived, in a completed way, that the dread monster effects its legitimate end, and bringeth forth Death.

§ 7. If there be any qualifications of the doctrine, above-delivered, of Virtue leading to Happiness, and Vice leading to Misery,—any qualifications other than have been already advanced; these of course should have a hearing. At present I am not aware of any other qualifications. I am aware indeed that the subject might be much drawn out: many

particulars might be brought in, in the way of details. But besides the great fact of the incessant conflict, the ever-waged battle, of Good against Evil, and Evil against Good, and the consequent limits and constraints set by the one to the actual progress of the other ; I do not know of any distinct consideration. In fine, how can there be any qualifications but those denoted, however dimly ? Apart from the limitations set by The Good, and its kingdom, to the Evil, and its kingdom, and by the Evil to The Good ; what should hinder each working, without let or hindrance, on and on ? Good tending always to happiness, more good and more happiness ; evil tending always to evil, and misery, more and more, without end.

§ 8. Those effects, namely, happiness and the reverse, are, then, the natural consequences, certainly the natural attendants, of Virtue and Viciousness. And if any one will, the effects in question might be designated *Rewards* and *Punishments*. Happiness may, indeed, be said to be the natural Reward of the good man ; as Misery may be said to be the natural Punishment of the evil man.

§ 9. All this which has been advanced is nothing but an appeal to those facts with which observation supplies us. A *demonstrative proof*, therefore, as it were out of the question, so it is quite unnecessary. In truth, we can demonstrate no fact regarding men : that is, we cannot demonstrate, in the strictest sense ; we can only prove in virtue of postulates. It may be noticed, in passing, that there is no more than *one fact, in all the universe*, which is truly strictly demonstrative, the fact of the Existence of GOD.† Nor can I support my statements regarding human nature by *authority* ; because the facts are so, or they are so, whatever any one may urge.

† See the " *Examination* " of *Antitheos*, Part I.

Authority, *as such*, would go for nothing. Yet, in a question as to any matter of fact, it is quite pertinent to adduce the testimony of those who are the best judges of what is really the fact. It is quite competent to produce *witnesses*, who shall testify as to what they have observed. Accordingly, taking *authority* in this reduced sense, I shall venture to adduce an authority; the authority of one whom the unvarying verdict of several successive generations of Englishmen, (the representatives, they, of the *practical judgment* of mankind,) has pronounced to be the very best judge, in the matter in hand. Divines and philosophers of all complexions, and throughout the world, have coincided with the verdict, or, at least, have acquiesced in it. 'Tis, of course, to Bishop Butler I allude, the author of the unsurpassed "Analogy."†

§ 10. The system to be pursued in making use of this most celebrated work, as a witness-authority, shall have the merit of extreme simplicity. The arrangement, as to the extracts, shall be this: First, those quotations more applicable to the doctrine or rule itself, that *given Virtue given Happiness, and given Viciousness given Unhappiness*, will make their appearance, to obtain the reader's assent and consent; and afterwards there shall be a specimen, at least, of passages noticing the traverses of the rule in question.

§ 11. As to the general rule, then, that Virtue=Happiness, and Vice=Unhappiness, the following passages may be adduced.

§ 12. "Now one might mention here, what has been often urged with great force, that, in general, less uneasiness, and more satisfaction, are the *natural consequences* of a virtuous than of a vicious course of life, *in the present state*, as an instance of a moral government established in nature; an

† See Note to this Scholium.

“ instance of it collected from *experience and present matter of fact.*”—“ I am far from allowing it doubtful whether “ virtue, upon the whole, be happier than vice *in the present world;* but if it were, yet the beginnings of a righteous “ administration may, beyond all question, be found in “ nature,” &c.

“ From the natural course of things, vicious actions are, “ to a great degree, actually punished as mischievous to so- “ ciety,” &c.

“ In the natural course of things, virtue, *as such*,¹ is actu- “ ally rewarded, and vice, *as such*,¹ punished; which seems “ to afford an instance, or example, not only of government, “ but of moral government begun and established; moral in “ the strictest sense,” &c.—“ Now I say, virtue, as such, *natu- rally* procures considerable advantages to the virtuous, and “ vice, as such, *naturally* occasions great inconvenience, and “ even misery, to the vicious, in very many instances. The “ immediate effects of virtue and vice upon the mind and “ temper are to be mentioned as instances of it. Vice, as “ such, is *naturally* attended with some sort of uneasiness, “ and not uncommonly with great disturbance and apprehen- “ sion.”—“ On the other hand, inward security and peace, and “ a mind open to the several gratifications of life, are the “ *natural* attendants of innocence and virtue,” &c.

“ Upon the whole, then, besides the good and bad effects “ of virtue and vice upon men’s own minds, *the course of this world* does, in some measure, turn upon the approba- “ tion and disapprobation of them, *as such*, in others.”

“ If a more distinct inquiry be made, whence it arises, “ that *virtue, as such, is often rewarded, and vice, as such,*

¹ These italics are the Bishop’s; but not infrequently the italics are the present author’s.

“ *is punished, AND THIS RULE NEVER INVERTED*; it will be
“ found to proceed, in part, immediately from the moral
“ nature itself which God has given us; and also, in part,
“ from his having given us, together with this nature, so
“ great a power over each other’s happiness and misery.”—
“ If it be thought, that there are instances of an appro-
“ bation of vice, as such, in itself, and for its own sake,
“ (though it does not appear to me that there is any such
“ thing at all; but, supposing there be,) it is evidently mon-
“ strous; as much so as the most acknowledged perversion
“ of any passion whatever. Such instances of perversion,
“ then, being left out as merely imaginary, or, however,
“ unnatural; it must follow, from the frame of our nature,
“ and from our condition, in the respects now described,
“ that vice cannot at all be, and virtue cannot but be,
“ favoured, as such, by others upon some occasions; and
“ happy in itself, in some degree. For what is here insisted
“ upon, is not the degree in which virtue and vice are thus
“ distinguished, but only the thing itself, that they are so
“ in some degree; though the whole good and bad effect of
“ virtue and vice, as such, is not inconsiderable in degree.
“ But that they must be thus distinguished, in some degree,
“ is in a manner necessary; *it is matter of fact, of daily ex-
“ perience, even in the greatest confusion of human affairs.*”

“ Our being so constituted as that virtue and vice are
“ thus *naturally* favoured and discountenanced, rewarded
“ and punished respectively as such, is *an intuitive proof of*
“ *the intent of nature that it should be so*; otherwise the
“ constitution of our mind, from which it thus imme-
“ diately and directly proceeds, would be absurd.”

“ We have then a declaration, in some degree of present
“ effect, from him who is supreme in nature, which side he
“ *is of, or what part he takes*, a declaration for virtue, and

“ against vice. So far, therefore, as a man is true to virtue, “ to veracity and justice, to equity and charity, and the “ right of the case, in whatever he is concerned, so far he “ is on the side of the divine administration, and co- “ operates with it; and from hence, to such a man, arises “ naturally a secret satisfaction and sense of security, and “ implicit hope of somewhat farther.”

“ This hope is confirmed by the necessary tendencies of “ virtue, which, though not of present effect, yet are at “ present discernible in nature; and so afford an instance “ of somewhat moral in the essential constitution of it: “ There is, in the nature of things, a *tendency* in virtue “ and vice to produce the good and bad effects now men- “ tioned in a greater degree than they do in fact produce “ them.”

“ The good and bad *tendencies* of virtue and vice”—“ *These tendencies are essential, and founded in the nature of things;* whereas the hindrances to their becoming “ effect are, in numberless cases, not necessary, but arti- “ ficial only.”

“ Upon the whole, there is a kind of moral government “ implied in God’s natural government; virtue and vice “ are *naturally* rewarded and punished as beneficial and “ mischievous to society, and *rewarded and punished directly as virtue and vice.*”

§ 13. The whole of the preceding citations have been purposely made,—and a great many more might have been made,—from the one chapter entitled “Of the Moral Government of God.”¹ I pause in quoting, not from a deficiency in the material, but from a fear of over-doing.

¹ “The Analogy of Religion, Natural and Revealed, to the Constitution and Course of Nature.”—Chapter iii. of Part I.

§ 14. In support of what may be called the qualifications of the doctrine or rule in question—qualifications which, if they limit the application, do also sustain the existence of the rule itself: the following quotations may be brought forward.

§ 15. "It is not pretended but that, in the natural course of things, happiness and misery appear to be distributed by other rules, than only the personal merit and demerit of characters. They may sometimes be distributed by way of mere discipline. There may be the wisest and best reasons why the world should be governed by general laws, from whence such promiscuous distribution probably must follow; and also why our happiness and misery should be put in each other's power, in the degree which they are. And these things, as in general they contribute to the rewarding virtue and punishing vice, as such, so they often contribute also, not to the inversion of this, which is impossible, but to the rendering persons *proverbial* *with* *wicked, afflicted* *though* *upright*, and which is worse, to the *rewarding some* *virtuous* *actions* *and* *punishing other actions*, *though* *virtuous*."

Good and bad men would be much more rewarded and punished as such, were it not that *justice is often* *accidentally* *obliged* *that characters are not known*, and many who would thus favour virtue and discourage vice, are hindered from doing so by accidental causes."

"Pleasure and pain are indeed, to a certain degree, say to a very high degree, distributed among us, *without any* *expressed regard to the merit or demerit of characters*."

§ 16. These quotations, also, are all taken from the same chapter, the third chapter of the First Part of the *farmed Analysis*. The number of the quotations might

have been much increased; and, if we had looked beyond the bounds of the one chapter—the natural reservoir, no doubt, of passages maintaining, and illustrating, the doctrine in question, as well as of passages setting forth, or alluding to, traversing conditions;—an endless array of passages bearing on the point in hand might have been at command. But enough to have shown what places that single chapter could produce.

§ 17. Bishop Butler was unquestionably a master-spirit in his own department. Yet in using this author, a certain other author desires it should be remembered, that the Bishop is cited, as a witness-authority, *only* so far as the “Analogy” is concerned, and for the purpose on account of which that celebrated performance is quoted. 'Tis possible, there are tones, even ground-tones, in that great work, not in perfect harmony with fundamental notes of the present author. There are few cases of minds in agreement as to all points, and in every respect.

SCHOLIUM III. (POSTPOSIT.)

§ 1. 'Tis the case, then, that, by the constitution and course of nature, the moral are actually happy; the immoral, the reverse.^a Now, an important immanent question awaits us here: Is such constitution founded in the eternal fitnesses of things, or not? is it intrinsically necessary, or is it, on the contrary, purely arbitrary? Let us put it otherwise. Is it an inherent power of virtue that it produce happiness? and, Is it inherent in vice to produce misery? Or, Is the reverse true? And, Are the happiness and the unhappiness merely

^a *Vide Schol. praeced.*

arbitrarily superadded qualities—superadded, that is, by the mere fiat, the mere will or good pleasure, of the Creator?^a

§ 2. But whereas the question, as put, does secretly distinguish between the nature of the Creator, and His good pleasure, or fiat, insinuating, too, that the nature and the particular will could possibly be disjoined and disconnected: it is to be observed, that the disconnection is impossible. This follows from Proposition II., where it was proved that GOD, the Creator, is necessarily True. Being most Truthful, He must manifest Himself as He is; He cannot, therefore, reveal Himself by a fiat, declarative of a general law, inconsistent with the reality of His nature. GOD's fiat, in fine, must be but the pure expression of Himself, as willing from, or in accordance with, His nature.

§ 3. This may be said to be an answer to the question by objecting to it, by objecting to an assumption radically contained in it, and by raising a previous question. Nevertheless, it appears to involve, in any view, an answer to the question. It answers by a decided negative as to the possible arbitrariness of any such fiat.

§ 4. Thus, the course of nature determining that virtue should produce happiness, and vice misery; it seems to follow, that the connection between the virtue and the happiness, the vice and the misery, is not arbitrary but necessary. That is, taking the constitution of things as an expression of the will—fiat, if you prefer the word—of GOD; it seems to be evident that the constitution of things, which fixes the connection in question, is unalterable. The expression of will being grounded in the nature of GOD, is therefore unchangeable. The essential attributes of GOD are immutable, if immutability be.

^a As to the creation of men, see Scholium under Part III. Division II.

§ 5. But as the relation of virtue to happiness, and of vice to misery, is an important subject; and it may be attended with good results to dwell upon the character of the connection in question; let us consider the matter yet a little further, by letting in new lights, and looking at the objects in other attitudes. Let us, starting afresh, put the question over again, while the ground of the objection which was sustained is dropt out.

§ 6. Is it inherent in virtue to be accompanied by happiness? and in vice to be accompanied by the reverse? Or, on the contrary, could virtue be followed, as a matter of course, by misery? and could vice be followed, by reason of the same law, by true happiness?

§ 7. Virtue leads, at present, to happiness; and vice, to misery.^a Now, this human virtue—of whatever it may consist, or of whatever particulars it may be composed—must be held to be, generally, expressive of conformity to the moral nature with which man is endowed; while vice, shortly, denotes departure from such conformity. Next, the virtue, which is simply conformity to the true moral nature of man, must be also allowed to be in conformity, *so far, at the very least*, with the moral nature with which man was originally endowed by his Creator; while the contrary holds as to vice. This is just what is meant by *Virtue*, or *Morality*; what, by the opposite, *Vice*. This is just the virtue and the vice about which the question asks: Otherwise, no question can be legitimately before us, as at this stage in our argument. We cannot logically ignore now the supposition of GOD, the Creator of men.

§ 8. This being so, the question before us almost answers itself. In viewing human virtue as a conformity, partial conformity it may be, to the moral nature with which man

^a *Vide Schol. praeced.*

was at first endowed, it must view virtue as being, to a certain extent at least, in conformity also with the nature of the Creator Himself. How, then, were it possible that virtue should not be followed by happiness, since the Creator Himself is Happy?^a Could conformity, in a variety of ways, to the Creator's own nature, lead to anything but something else equally in conformity with the nature of the Creator? Could living as GOD would have us live; being, so, like Himself; conduct but to something like Himself? Could it possibly conduct to anything unlike Himself?—So, too, regarding vice. This is disconformity to the true nature of man, and, so, to the nature of GOD. How, then, could it lead to happiness, or aught but the reverse of happiness? How could disconformity, in important regards, to the God-like, lead but to some other un-God-like disconformity? Could the vice, the unlike GOD, lead to happiness, the like GOD?

§ 9. Thus the question^b is to be met with a decided negative, approaching it by the track pursued. But while, throughout the preceding, the elements of Virtue and Vice predominated; in what is to follow, certain other elements will be the predominating ones.

§ 10. The question, then, being looked at with the element of Happiness, and that of Misery, its reverse, prominently in the foreground; it is fortunate that we can, at once, answer, that any alternative, such as the question presents, cannot be entertained for one moment. The connection between virtue and happiness, and vice and misery, is indissoluble, being grounded in the very nature of things which are themselves immutable.

§ 11. The reason why the connection in question is un-

^a *Div. III. Prop. I.*

^b *Viz.* as in § 6.

alterable is, because the supposition of aught else were quite inconsistent with the nature of that Supreme already demonstrated. He is, for example, necessarily consummately Happy.^a And, so far as He produces anything *like Himself*, He must effect creaturely Happiness, only creaturely Happiness.^b That is, by the constitution of things established by GOD, the creature man, following the laws of its highest or inmost being, must be happy. Un-happiness is the un-like GOD; unhappiness, therefore, can only be the attribute of creatures unlike GOD. There will be no dispute as to whether the moral part of the nature of moral beings be the main seat of happiness, worthy of the name, and of unhappiness. True happiness, if not itself a moral quality, is necessarily associated with moral qualities. Perhaps it is an index to their state and condition: the greater the true happiness, the more the genuine moral qualities are in exercise. Happiness, in fine, if not a moral faculty, is at least a *quasi* moral faculty; and it is certainly a very important quality, whatever else it be. It follows, that moral creatures, unlike GOD as to happiness, presuppose a change to have taken place with regard to them since the time of their being created. Thus: Certain creatures are unhappy, that is, habitually so. Being unhappy, they are unlike GOD. A race of moral creatures, unlike GOD, must in time have become so: that is, they must, in some way or other, have degenerated, or become sinners. GOD cannot be supposed to have for creatures, the direct work of His own hands,¹ beings unlike

^a Div. III. Prop. I.

^b See § 4 of Sub-Prop. under Prop. I. Div. III.

¹ Of course, the reader will understand that the use, whether here or elsewhere, of anthropomorphic language, is only for effect. The course of this argument will prevent the possibility of any misunderstanding on such a point.

Himself, opposed to Himself, in their moral qualifications; as this would involve an effect without a cause; or, rather, it would involve an effect proceeding from an inadequate and impossible cause, a thing, if possible, even more absurd than the other. The creatures, therefore, as they came from GOD, at their creation, must have resembled GOD; in other words, they must have been in His image and likeness. They must have been, therefore, happy. That is, as moral beings, with their moral natures entire, and in legitimate exercise; which in other words is just saying, truly and thoroughly virtuous beings; they must have been happy. Being like GOD, being virtuous or innocent, man (very properly we shall by no means be allowed to call him *the Adamic man*) was necessarily very happy.

§ 12. All this is, unless I mistake the matter much, a demonstration, founded upon the nature, or the attributes, of GOD, of the real connection which exists between virtue and happiness, and, consequentially, between vice and misery; when one ascends to the source of things, where, only, things at their perfection can be seen. In Scholium II., the connection between imperfect virtue, and imperfect happiness, in man, as he at present is, is stated as a *fact of experience*: and herein we have been greatly busied with an enquiry as to human virtue and happiness as man must have existed when he came fresh from his Creator's hands.¹ To this enquiry, the application of strict *a priori* reasoning is quite practicable and legitimate. And should any one deem it to be otherwise, in general, or in particular, he has no more to do than put his finger on the place where is the wrongness in what is advanced. An objector has only to shew, that *a priori* reasoning is totally inapplicable, or point out wherein it has been positively misapplied in the detail.

¹ See last note on preceding page.

§ 13. And now to enforce that for which much of the foregoing is an excellent preparation. Goodness and happiness are intimately, yea inseparably, associated; as well as are the opposites, badness and unhappiness.^a When, therefore, GOD acts in relation to a good man,¹ as such, He is in contact with a happy man.¹ And when God manifests Himself towards a happy man, the man is, of course, made to be more happy. The good man is naturally happy: moreover, he necessarily becomes more so, in the case where GOD, The Blessed One^b (*O Μακάριος*), in acting, just reveals or communicates Himself.

§ 14. In like manner, when the consummately Happy Being specially reveals Himself to a bad man,¹ the man, naturally unhappy, is necessarily made to become more miserable.¹ Just because, in the case supposed, a Nature diametrically opposite, and "contrary,"[†] is in contact with the evil of the bad man. It is, indeed, an awful thought—but one of the most pregnant with high consequences of any which deal in the great concernments of moral matters—that the mere contact of goodness and evil, where the goodness is over-poweringly influential, should result in misery, or, rather, an increase in misery, to the bad. But it is inevitably so. Such is the constitution of things: *and it could not be otherwise.* It could not be otherwise, simply because GOD is GOD, and cannot cease to be GOD.

^a Schol. II. & Schol. III. to this Sect.

^b Div. III. Prop. I.

¹ "A good man;" "a happy man;" "a bad man;" an "unhappy," or a "miserable" man.

These expressions, and others coined after the same fashions, are, of course, to be taken in connection with their proper qualifications. It cannot be deemed to be necessary to qualify, on every occasion, propositions, or expressions, which have been qualified once for all. See Scholium II., Sect. 5, 6, &c.

[†] See Note to this Scholium: Note A.

§ 15. Sinners (and no others need concern themselves about the contents of this section,) sinners, I say, may well hate God, because He increases their misery when He draws nigh unto them. Sinners, however, and sin, are not the same, and not every thing which is true of the one, is true of the other also. Sin (to personify), inasmuch as her domain is intensified, and so increased, by the contact of God with the nature in which sin reigns, may yet be imagined to rejoice herein. Sin, in becoming more conscious to herself of her 'exceeding sinfulness,'† becoming enlarged, or intensified, by contact with God, may be imagined to rejoice at this the extension of her borders. Still, Sin, the monster-mother of all human anguish, should she, in portentous audacity, court for such reason the thought of God, should also remember, that she courts the contact of her bane: not wise, but foolish, to allow herself to be drawn within the vortex of that mighty influence which shall at last be her inevitable destruction. When Sin hath fully conceived, by reason of her visions of God, her offspring will assuredly be Death. And Death, once brought fairly forth, will have an insatiable maw, maw never to be satisfied until Sin herself, own mother of Death, shall be consumed. And then his occupation being entirely gone, and his subsistence no longer possible, but thoroughly impossible, Death himself shall die.‡

§ 16. If I may be allowed, for once, to indulge in a practical reflection, to which the subject almost irresistibly invites, I should remark, that it is pre-eminently sinners, "miserable sinners," who yet madly cry, in their hearts, to God, 'Depart from us, for we desire not the knowledge of Thy ways,' who *should* desire the contact of the Good One, even though He approach as

† See Note to this Scholium : Note B.

‡ See Note to this Scholium : Note C.

the Just God; for in the increase, and the ever increase, of their misery, lies the direction of the only door of hope. In the increase of the misery, lies the direction of the only hope, so far as hope may be imagined to arise to the sinner, as only a sinner, from his own quarter: which is, after all, an imagination of a thing attended by real impossibilities. For there is, of a truth, no hope at all for the sinner from nature. The whole field of nature has not one ground of hope for the sinner, as such. To have hope, the sinner must be—somewhat more than a sinner.

§ 17. To pursue this train of thought for a moment longer. To have hope, the sinner must forsake his way, and, as unrighteous, his thoughts, the very thoughts which constitute, as it were, his radical nature, as his nature has come to be. Then, indeed, repenting, or changing his mind; ceasing to do evil, and learning to do well; becoming, in fine, a new man; God can be the Just God to him, and yet a source of blessedness. This may be a comforting reflection to those whom it concerns.

§ 18. The preceding, if you kindly leave out the merely hortative part, if there be such, and the *practical*; is nothing but what is legitimately consistent with our doctrine, which deals only in *a priori* principles. But there is a terrible hitch in the progress. No *a priori* reasoning; neither *a priori* principle, nor application of any *a priori* principle; can tell how a man, being evil, is, in consistency with the strict rules of the attribute in question, to be changed into a good being: For this would involve a new creation, and, so, it would transcend the region of the laws of pure Justice. *A priori* reasoning, not ascending above the plane of this attribute of Justice, can do no more than tell how the Just or Righteous God acts towards the good and the bad, the happy and the unhappy, as such, and the results, in accordance with the established course of nature, in the first place, and, in the next, with the constitution of things, as related to each other by eternal fitnesses.

SCHOLIUM IV. (POSTPOSIT.)

§ 1. It has been stated,^a that Happiness may be said to be the natural Reward of the good man, and Misery the natural Punishment of the evil man. This brings us, in a general way, to the great topic of *Rewards and Punishments*. May it not be said with truth, that, for us, men, (and sinners, as we unquestionably are, on the supposition of a GOD, of Truth,^b and of Justice,^c who created us in His own image and likeness, morally,) not the least important subject falling to be discussed, under this Proposition relating to GOD's Justice, is this same subject of Rewards and Punishments? Or, might it not be said, with propriety, that the doctrine of PUNISHMENTS, solely, is, for mankind as they commonly are, the important matter in this whole inquiry? A form of the question which would surely fit the topic more accurately to the occasion, than one which introduced the subject of REWARDS as an equally prominent element.†

§ 2. Connected, then, with the great subject of good and evil, of happiness and unhappiness, of Reward and Punishment, there is still a question remaining for consideration; a question yielding, in importance and interest, to none whatever. The particular subject is that of future Rewards and Punishments, or, to express it more accurately, Rewards and Punishments in a future state. How (this is the precise question) are these Rewards and Punishments of the future to be affected by that Inflexible Justice of God?

§ 3. A question, that, which has been reserved till now.

^a Viz. in Schol. II. § 8.

^b Prop. II.

^c Demonstration preced.

† See Note to this Scholium: Note A.

And 'tis quite true that such special question might have been left out of consideration altogether. 'Twere possible to complete the construction of AN *a priori* Argument containing a reference to the Moral Attributes, even the whole of the Moral Attributes, without entering upon any discussion of the Rewards and the Punishments of the Future. But to give the complete go-by to that topic were to omit the topic of perhaps the greatest human interest of all in this whole inquiry. Not, indeed, the enquiry concerning the Being and the Attributes, but that more limited one which concerns this Moral region of the Attributes. Now, an *a priori* Argument which omitted topics of the deepest interest would be of too dry a character to invite the attention of the mass of mankind. There might be all the essential fixities of the structure: each individual permanent of a perfect skeleton might be present: But, after all, the bones would be dry bones. "Rather the skeleton of an argument," "than any "thing entitled to be considered as a full and finished performance."†

§ 4. Under this Proposition, then, relating to GOD's inflexible Justice, we are to consider the subject of Rewards and Punishments, not only in a general way, and as to the present life,^a but as to the life after death, in the world, not of time, but of eternity.

§ 5. To argue on such topic, here, is quite a legitimate procedure: if the method pursued be certainly within the confines of the true, whether or not the "high," "*priori* road." And we shall be very guarded indeed in taking care that the indispensable condition be complied with. Everything which undeniably follows from, or is a strict applica-

^a As above, Schol. II. & III.

† See Note to this Scholium, Note B.

tion of, the first principles of our science, which themselves must be unimpugnable; every such thing, I say, is legitimately introducible, and, in a question of *title*, must be allowed to remain.

§ 6. It may, however, appear, especially to some, that this is not so; and, in order that no misapprehension may be permitted to take place, an explanation may be extremely expedient. I am not going, then, to found on—or even to take for granted, so much, or so little, as—the fact of the existence of a life for man after death. To do otherwise, were to argue *a posteriori*, and I shall not argue, to even the least extent, in the *a posteriori* way: There shall be no holding out of *a flag of distress*. All *a posteriori* arguers introduce, and found on, the existence of a future state of retribution, of, that is, rewards and punishments, as an integral part of their case. They are obliged to do so, in order to eke out their conclusions as to the Perfect Goodness, and, generally, the existence of the Moral (Infinite!) Attributes of the Deity: since these *perfect attributes* cannot (as is too evident) be established, without such a formidable postulate, and from a sole survey of the “mixt and confused,” “jarring and discordant,”† phenomena of life around us, from which alone the *a posteriori* arguments must be all drawn. The other world is anxiously brought in to remedy the inequalities, and gross disorders of this. In fine, the other world is the last resort always of *a posteriori* arguments, and arguers, when, hard pressed, they have nothing else to adduce, except what is against them.‡

§ 7. But, on this occasion, the reader must not be let into the whole secret of the *a posteriori* method. The outline

† See Note to this Scholium: Note C.

‡ See Note to this Scholium: Note D.

given will suffice for present purposes. I am not going to pursue, or even imitate, the common method ; and it will suffice, that I clearly set forth the thing I am to do.

§ 8. *On supposition*, that there is a future state, How does the inflexible Justice of GOD stand in relation to it ? The Justice of GOD, demonstrated once and for ever, and being therefore taken now for granted ; and the existence of a future state being supposed, *for argument's sake* ; how do the two meet and affect each other ? How are we to apply, to the imagined (or imaginary) denizens of the kingdoms beyond the grave, the doctrine that GOD is inflexibly Just ? Such the question in hand.

§ 9.—No doubt some writers have contended, that the doctrine of the reality of a future state does, in truth, belong to Natural Religion, and *a fortiori* Theology ; and, if it be so, I might, perhaps, have taken ground a little different, and a little higher. “The general consideration of a future state of punishment *most evidently belongs* to the subject of Natural Religion.” So says Bishop Butler,¹ and it requires some daring to dissent from any of his clearly-advanced utterances. It may, therefore, be so : whatever it was which the great Bishop meant to cover by his position. Yet the Argument, *a priori*, for a GOD, does not require the postulate of a future state for men : far less, a state of future retribution. But, if *you suppose* the existence of a future state of rewards and punishments, or if we mutually agree to adopt such a *hypothesis*, the argument in question can apply the clear intuitive, or deductive, ideas in which it deals to the case of such a supposition. It will be observed how wide the difference between the two things: the founding upon a future state *as part of one's case* ; and the merely applying *a priori*

¹ “Analogy :” Part I. chap. ii.

ideas to a future state, *supposed as fact*. So wide, that, if any make such a hypothesis, (as men are very apt no doubt to do,) they do not perhaps do any such very unreasonable thing. To entreat to get leave to make such a supposition, in order to see what would follow, is a modest, as well as reasonable, request.—

§ 10. To come to close-quarters, then, with our question.^a In answering, there will be, after all, no great difficulty. But stay—When one asks, Is the natural Punishment of the evil, as well as the natural Reward of the righteous, to continue in the future state? are they, indeed, to last for ever? not one question, but two questions, are put. A superficial consideration may observe no more than one great question, although in two parts. But, in reality, there are two distinct questions, under the envelope, and, if you will, the appearance, of one question. For, the question, Shall the natural punishment, and the natural reward, last for ever? admits of being looked at in two very different lights.

§ 11. The one question is: So far as the single attribute of Justice (with which alone, as under this Proposition, we are concerned) is involved, will the punishment of the wicked, and the reward of the good, be for ever? The other question is a far wider one. It is this: So far as GOD, with *all* His Attributes, including, of course, yea pre-eminently, His perfect Goodness, proceeding from His consummate Happiness, the very attributes from the activity and action of which the creation itself of men arose; the very attributes (I am only varying the expression a little) which called the men themselves into being:—I say, taking all the Attributes of GOD into the account, Will the punishment of the wicked, and the reward of the good, be for ever? This is

^a See §§ 2 & 8.

obviously a very different question from the other: and quite possibly, this latter is a question which will fall to be answered in a very different manner from that in which reply must be made to the former.

§ 12. But the thing which concerns us is this, that, with the answer which ought to be returned to the latter question, we have nothing to do at the present stage, or as under this Proposition relating to Justice, to Justice only. The question, and the answer, must be reserved for the fit place.^a The other question, however, concerns us; and it might, with some truth, be said that it concerns us all the more that we are obliged, in strict logical procedure, to pass over, now, the wider, and, probably, more deeply interesting, question.

§ 13. It has been said, that, there will be little difficulty in answering our question^b: I now add, our question as necessarily limited.^c Will the punishment of the wicked, and the reward of the good, be for ever, so far as Justice alone is concerned?

§ 14. The solution of whatever difficulty there is, or may be imagined to be, is to be found in the circumstance that there is no new element introduced into the case put, except the (assumed) fact of the existence being after the death of the body on earth.[†] Now, the introduction of this element of mere continuance of the life of men cannot disturb, in any way, or to any extent, the application of the rule valid for the Inflexible Justice; that is to say, its application to *the same objects as before, substantially the same*.

^a See below, Scholium III. under Prop. IV.

^b Above, § 10.

^c § 11.

[†] See Note to this Scholium: Note E.

§ 13. It must be plain to every mind, that the strict Justice of God is the same this year as it was the last year, and as it will be the next year, and for ever. Mere continuance, any amount of perpetuity one likes to imagine, of existence of the objects can, of itself, make no difference in the application of the regulating principle. And, by hypothesis, the continued existence is the sole new element in the matter.*

§ 14. The law, or rule, is :

The inflexibly Just God acts towards

Good who are also happy, men, as being, in reality, good, and happy, men; and towards

Evil men, who are likewise unhappy men, as being, in truth, such.^b

Now, no difference can arise when the scene for the display of the Justice is in one state of being rather than in another; is in *want* it this way, if you please—the spiritual world rather than on this earth.* The Infexible Justice of the Supreme, which renders to every man according to his works, proceeding from the state of his mind, cannot alter itself, nor submit to alteration brought about from without, even if causes for alteration could exist, as they cannot: and the objects presented to the Justice being the same, to wit, good and blessed men here, and bad and miserable men there, the result is the same.

§ 17. The result is the same. The good are, in consequence of the manifestation of God, in His Justice, to them, made to be more happy; and the more manifestation, the more blessedness: While the evil are, by the same means,

* *Prædict. sect.*

^b *Schol. III.*

^c *See Dem. above. Sect. 2. 3.*

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† *See Note to this Scholium. Note F.*

made to become more miserable, ever more miserable. And so on, with regard to both classes of men, without end.

§ 18. Without end? Ah! *there's the rub.* Without end, should you lay down that the men, the good men, and the bad men, have no end. But if your position were, that the men had an end; then, the natural reward, and the natural punishment would, of course, have an end too. How could it be otherwise? But what? shall the men, then, themselves have an end, or shall they continue in existence for ever? Of course, their reward, or their punishment, cannot go on without the men as subjects of inhesion: but as to the continuance perpetually of the men, themselves, the men good, and the men bad, how is it?

§ 19. Justice cannot tell. This attribute must admit, that the ground for the answer "is not in"¹ her. Justice can, in fact, throw no light, not the faintest ray, upon this topic. If we want more light let in, we must open a window, exposed to another region of the heavens above us all.

§ 20. Thus, the question, Taking the single attribute of Justice into account, will the reward of the righteous, will the punishment of the wicked, last after death? has received its answer. And every reader must needs have been satisfied with the accuracy of the solution. We have kept within the mark, and we have answered correctly.

¹ Words taken from Job xxviii. 14.

PROPOSITION IV.

Necessarily God is Love.

PROLEGOMENON.

§ 1. Having the Proposition, *God is Loving*, given as one to be evinced by strict demonstration, may seem indeed one of the most startling of strange proposals. Perhaps, it will startle the great majority of readers, even among the class who may be the most favourably disposed towards *a priori* argumentation for a real existence. Yet strange as this proposition may sound, when uttered by an advocate of *a priori* argument, still he is confident of being able to prove, by the severest reasoning, of the character demanded, and impervious to the shafts of the keenest logic which may be opposed, that GOD is Love. The careful reader must remember what has been already advanced: namely, That every position which undeniably follows from our first principles, *themselves altogether unimpugnable*, is introducible, and, in fact, has a real title to remain among the truths of our science.* Likewise, That, if any objector, who may present himself, has not very much to do, he has still something to do. *An objector has only to show, that a priori reasoning is totally inapplicable, or point out wherein it has been positively misapplied in the detail.*^b

§ 2. But to facilitate our progress in demonstrating the proposition before us, I shall, first of all, lay down two pre-suppositions, in a distinct form. I might indeed have sub-

* See § 5 of Schol. IV. under Prop. III. Div. III.

^b Sect. 12 of Schol. III. under Prop. III. Div. III.

sumed them as I went along, without any such explicit enunciation, and verily in a noiseless and unpretentious way. Unpretentiousness is generally commendable: yet 'tis laudable only where no illicit assumption is concealed under the affected reticence; and every assumption is improper which is not meant for the eye. An assumption not meant for the eye is dishonest; and, so, it discreetly courts the shade. In fine, 'twas deemed best to proceed in the most undisguised and open manner. Besides, what ill consequences need be feared from the formal exposure of the postulates in question?

LEMMA I.

§ 1. On the supposition of a creation of the world, the continuance of the same in being is equal to (not, observe, identical with) the continually repeated creation of the particulars and their continent.

§ 2. 'Tis clear, that *created* existence implies the relative *Creator*. Existence, by reason of a Being having made the things begin to be, is dependent, of course, on the Being. In fine, conservation, or preservation of existence, is plainly tantamount to continued creation, on supposition of a creation.

LEMMA II.

On the supposition of the conservation of things, consequent on a creation; the supposition of the possibility of an annihilation of any, or of all, of the things actually existing, involves no contradiction, nor even difficulty. The supposition, that things began to be, involves that they may, as a possibility, cease to be. Creation involves the possibility of annihilation. A Creator, therefore, may annihilate.

DEMONSTRATION.

§ 1. It has been demonstrated, that the Supreme is consummately Happy,^{a†} and that the motive to create was the overflowing Happiness, indistinguishable this from the Goodness, of the Creator.^{b†} Now, a great deal is contained in these positions; and it will be necessary that we weigh well their fulness of meaning.

§ 2. In the next place, we must consider the force of the proposition, that preservation or conservation is tantamount to continued creation;^{c||} not overlooking what is implied thereby.

§ 3. For the consequence is truly important. Creation involves Happiness and Goodness: the conservation, therefore, must also involve the Goodness. I say, conservation being equivalent to continued creation; while creation itself proceeded from the Goodness of GOD: the conservation must be regarded as the product of the same Goodness.

§ 4. But to come a little closer still to our point. The attribute of Goodness it was which brought the race of man into being.^d Preservation is just creation indefinitely prolonged:^e The preservation of man upon the face of the earth, is, therefore, due to that attribute of Goodness.

§ 5. Now, *Goodness*, calling men into existence, and preserving them in being, after their creation; this is *Love* to

^a Div. III. Prop. I.

^b Div. III. Sub-Prop. after Prop. I.

^c Lemma I.

^d Schol. under Part III. Div. II.;

together with § 2 of Sub-Prop. to Prop. I. Div. III.

† See Note to this Demonstration: Note A.

‡ See Note to this Demonstration: Note B.

|| See Note to this Demonstration: Note C.

men.† If, in fact, Goodness be viewed as a permanent condition or state of mind; Love may be viewed as the same Goodness in exercise, or in its acts. In truth: Given Goodness, preserving the men whom the Goodness created, and have you not Love? What else could be meant by Love? Verily, such Goodness preserving men, is but another name for Love to men.†

§ 6. We must bear in mind where we are. Our stand-point will be seen in the following recapitulatory positions. The world, with all it contains, began to be.^a In particular, our race was created;^b and the Goodness of the consummately Happy Supreme was the cause of the creation.^c In fine, *Man became*, is to us equal, in logical force, or apodictically, to saying, Goodness, creating, was in lively exercise. The living Goodness, as a potency, was put forth in acts. And now 'tis added: Conservation involving continued Goodness;^d the Goodness, in such continuous living act, is Love.†

§ 7. As a matter of course, this is another *relative* Attribute. *Love* imperatively needs an *object*. The nature of Love is such that it incessantly craves after an object. Without any object, Love would inevitably cease to be Love, becoming an unsatisfied longing for—it would not know what: there could remain no more than an everlasting pining. Love, then, must have its object: Without it, Love itself were unhappy. Completely Happy Love; in other words, the Love of The Consummately Happy One; must have its object: ay, and an adequate object too. An insufficient object could not meet, or (for language, with its

^a Sub-Prop. & Coroll. from same after Prop. IV. Part II. Div. I.

^b Schol. after Part III. Div. II.

^c Sub-Prop. after Prop. I. Div. III.

d § 3.

† See Note to this Demonstration: Note D.

‡ See Note to this Demonstration: Note E.

limited power, threatens to fail us here) be equal to the requirements of the yearnings of the Love of the Eternal, Infinite One. Anything contained within Time and Space would be, mayhap, all too little. At all events, *Love* imperatively needs an object. The objective, *of some sort*: whether a Hypostasis in the Godhead,^a† or some phase of the creaturely nature; this latter, again, being divisible into the angelic nature,^b and the human nature. Of course, we eschew the consideration of every object rising above the plane of mankind; in the same way as was done in the case of the proposition about Truth.^c

§ 8. This is a *most relative* Proposition, if you like. For, should it be argued, that, strictly, as Goodness is to all things, or may be conceived to regard all things, in creation; so Love is certainly not applicable to even animality generally, but, in propriety, can be considered applicable to only humanity, the Intelligent and Moral, the Rational and Loving, part of the world, I should not be greatly inclined to dispute it.^d

§ 9. On the whole, as it has been demonstrated, that the Simple *One*, Being of Infinity of Expansion and of Duration, who is All-knowing, All-powerful, entirely Free, and completely Happy, is necessarily perfectly Good;^d the implied Goodness being entirely equivalent to Love;^e the conclusion is, therefore, inevitable, that that Great and Good Being is necessarily Loving, or, to vary the phraseology, Love itself.

§ 10. Then, *One* is necessarily *Love*.

^a Consider, now, § 3 of Lemma 1, Prop. II, Division III.

^b Wough, here § 7 of Lemma specified in preceding reference.

^c Prop. II, Lemma 1, Sects. 6, 7.

^d sub Prop. 1, Prop. I, Dir. III.

^e Above, Sect. 5.

† See Note to this Demonstration: Note F.

‡ See Note to this Demonstration: Note G.

SCHOLIUM I.

§ 1. A great difference must be noticed between the cases of Truth and Justice, and the case of Love ; and it shall be our business, here, to distinguish between the cases, as the nature of things demands.

§ 2 Whereas, the demonstrations, in the cases of *Truth* and *Justice*, are to this effect : *if* there be objects, and *if* there be action ; GOD is, necessarily, Truthful, and Just. But the action itself is not proved.

§ 3. To particularize. To be True, requires objects.^a GOD is necessarily Truthful to man, when He communicates with man.^b But the communication itself is not demonstrated : Consequently, Truthfulness, as a fact, is never proved.

§ 4. So with regard to Justice. To be Just requires objects,^c and objects of a special description.^d GOD necessarily administers Justice, in communicating with the good and with the bad.^e But the actual administration itself of the Justice, in reference to those objects, is never demonstrated : Consequently, no one exercise of the attribute in question is ever demonstratively established.

§ 5. But, with regard to *Love*, 'tis quite otherwise. For, when there is postulated, now, what has been demonstrated, that Love does conserve the men whom Goodness created,^f the existence itself of the men, the objects of the Love, is irreversibly bestowed. Love does, therefore, evidence the existence of its own objects, by its intimate living relation to them.

§ 6. In truth, nobody—except, perhaps, a stray metaphysician (maddened by all-unadulterated *egoistic* eman-

^a Prop. II. Lemma I.

^d Prop. III. Lemma III.

^b Prop. II. Dem. Sect. 2-5.

^e Prop. III. Dem. § 3.

^c Prop. III. Lemma I.

^f Dem. above, Sect. 5, 6.

tions,† inhaled undilutedly, and, by a great deal, too incautiously) dreaming in a region hopelessly beyond the sphere common to Theists and Atheists, and very far indeed away in the clouds ; he (a man himself, it is to be presumed) having been expressly transported thither by no other machinery than his own pure and simple, but wrapt, imagination, helped, mayhap, by a push from Fichte, or some other as sober German philosopher, at starting : nobody, I say, but a stricken metaphysician, denies the existence of men. Nobody denies, therefore, the existence of the objects of this attribute of Love.

§ 7. And this is now to be considered : Whether it is credible, that, Goodness having created men, and Love being concerned in preserving them, GOD, as possessor of the attributes of Trueness and Justness, should never, on any occasion, reveal Himself to men, or come, in any way, into living contact with them ? Love has men for its cosmical objects : GOD loves the world of men : Were it not incredible, therefore, that the GOD of Truth, and Justice, should never draw nigh unto men ; draw nigh, for example, unto the virtuous and good, who resemble Himself, to bless them yet more and more.^a Yea, Love makes it plain, that GOD's presence with men is credible, and more than credible : the utter absence of GOD were incrediblē. Incredible, indeed, and impossible, too, that Love should never communicate with its objects, whom, yet, it conserves from day to day. Love and GOD are the same :^b GOD does, therefore, communicate with Love's objects, that is, men. But GOD is Truthful, and Just, as well as Loving. In fine, Love must be supposed to have Truth and Justice in its train. The three Attributes meet in the

• See Prop. III. Schol. III. § 13, &c.

• Dem. above, § 9.

† See Note to this Scholium: Note A.

same GOD, the common Substrate of all the Attributes: Therefore, the three do necessarily go together.

§ 8. Thus, it is proved, that the condition of Truth, as actual fact, and the condition of Justice, as actual fact, have been implemented. And, so, what was before demonstrated as *in posse*, is now demonstrated as *in esse*; the only postulate subsumed, by the demonstration, being one equally inoffensive and unobjectionable, the position, to wit, *There are men*. A position very secure from assailment on the side of Atheism; as Atheists are agreed in ignoring, not men indeed, but all but men. So far from denying the existence of men, Atheists go to the opposite extreme, and deny all mental existence which is not a man's.

§ 9. The present demonstration is, thus, the complement, not only of the Proposition as to Goodness,^a—as it unquestionably is,—but also it is (though in another way) the complement of the Proposition regarding Truth,^b as well as of that regarding Justice.^c For which reason, the importance of this Proposition cannot be rated too highly. The importance of this Proposition cannot be rated too highly, even if we were to urge nought about its importance on its own account. But such importance, in its turn, cannot be overrated.

§ 10. For, Love is, without doubt, a tree of Life: in a certain good sense, it is the tree of Life. It is, in fact, the mundane Yggdrasil. To vary our view, and enlarge, to the utmost, the illustrating medium: Love is the central attractive power of the universe. It is the centre, whence all influential radiations must depart, and to which they must return as their proper home. There is, of necessity, an inmost Spiritual Sun to the Universe; a central influence appertaining to the sum total of all the forces of every world,

^a Sub-Prop. under Prop. I. Div. III. ^b Prop. II. Div. III.

^c Prop. III. Div. III.

and every system of worlds. There must be supposed a centre; in other words, a Sun of all Suns, material and spiritual: otherwise, related things would be out of proportion to each other, and apparent effects would be unlawfully divorced from their only possible causes.

§ 11. *God is Love*; and, when we say so, we evoke the omnipotent word which throws warmth upon the field of our world. Possessed of this secret, we feel we are in possession of the talisman yielding the primal causation.† When we have reached Love, we have reached (to use the most humanly significant expression) *the very heart of God*.

§ 12. And if Love is omnipotent at one pole, equally so is it at the opposite pole. Strong as an aggressive force, it is equally strong as a resisting force. Equally positive: equally negative.

§ 13. What, now, can resist the Love of GOD? What can be stronger than the great motive power of the absolute universe?‡

SCHOLIUM II.

§ 1. In the preceding Scholium there was pointed out one great difference between Propositions II. and III., and the present Proposition.^a There are other differences; and it may be wise to take this opportunity, so fit and suitable in every way, to draw attention to some of those other differences.

§ 2. Why, or from what cause, Creation? And how do the several attributes of Truthfulness, Justice, and Goodness = Love, stand affected to Creation, and to each other

^a See § 1 of Schol. I.

† See Note to this Scholium: Note B.

‡ See Note to this Scholium: Note C.

with reference to that relation? These are the questions to which attention shall be now directed.

§ 3. *Supposing* the fact of a creation—*Supposing*, in other words, that the world which is around us, and the worlds upon worlds which are around our little ball as a centre, with all things in these continents, *began sometime to be* (a point demonstrated^a); when 'tis asked, Why was that world created? the answer (as we have seen^b) is: Because of the over-flowing, as 'twere, of the Happiness of the Being who is the Substratum of Expansion and Duration, Immensity and Eternity.† I say again: The Happiness of the Supreme does, as it were, flow over: Over-flowing, it, freely, out-births itself in Creation. And this is Goodness: at any rate, one great part of Goodness.

§ 4. But were one to ask *abstractly*, that is, *abstracting* in mind creation *as fact*, with its only possible cause; were one to ask abstractly, Why, or, Whence Creation? a totally different state of things would be presented. Our stand-point would be different: the objects seen would be different: The vision, therefore, would be reported (because presented) quite differently. In the case now supposed, we would not be in possession of the indispensable condition of the unspeakable Happiness of the One self-existent Substance. But this whole matter shall be made very plain.

§ 5. And to begin at the beginning. Were the question put, Will the Supreme create? the question being taken in and by itself, it could not be answered. The reasons, or causes, would be awanting. In the case at present imagined, the *fact* of creation would be out of sight: creation would be only possible. And whether the Supreme would, or would

^a Div. I. Part II. Sub-Prop. and Coroll. therefrom.

^b Div. III. Sub-Prop. § 1, &c.

† See Note to this Scholium.

not, create, could not be declared. The question could be answered only by the help of certain assumed positions.^a Creation being viewed as no more than a mere possibility; and the theorem of complete Happiness^b being entirely omitted; one could by no means decide even this,—*Whether* it were *likely* that there would be a *creation* at all, *or not*. The premises warranting a decision would be absent. On the other hand, the Happiness^b being taken into account; creation *would be likely*: Not necessary, by reason of the entire Freeness,^c but very likely. In fine, when we view creation as a possibility, and not yet actually being, the absolute attribute of Happiness is the attribute to which we must look.

§ 6. But another *datum* shall next be postulated. On the supposition of a creation of men,—a point itself demonstrated elsewhere,^d—we have demonstrated Goodness to be an Attribute:^e the transitional Attribute; intermediate between the *absolute* attributes of Divisions I. & II., and the really *relative* attributes of this Division.^f We have demonstrated, I say, Goodness to be an attribute. That is; accepting the creation of man as a fact; then, applying to the attribute of Happiness,^b we prove that the one must be assigned as the cause of the other:^e Happiness resulting in Goodness, and Creation, are in relation to each other as cause and effect.^e Thus, the question of creation is one about Goodness. This is the attribute to which creation must be attached.

^a Consider what is said in § 3 of Lemma I. Prop. II. Div. III.

^b Div. III. Prop. I. ^c Div. II. Part III.

^d Coroll. from Sub-Prop. in Part II. Div. I.; and Schol. after Part III. Div. II. ^e Div. III. Sub-Prop.

^f See Div. III. Prop. II. Lemma. I. § 3.—Coroll. from Prop. II. Lemma II. § 4.—Prop. III. Lemma III. § 5. To which may be added Prop. IV. Dem. Sect. 7, 8.

§ 7. Of course, we may affirm nearly the same thing of Conservation, so far furth as conservation is tantamount to continued creation.^a Conservation, as well as Creation, is the result of Goodness.

§ 8. I repeat it: If the question, Taking for granted creation, why creation? be put; the attributes of Happiness and Goodness give us the answer. And they only are capable of entering into the solution.

§ 9. But when we are abreast of Justice, 'tis quite another case. Another attribute has been introduced, and a quite different field is before us.

§ 10. These topics, tho' they may be comparatively uninteresting to many minds, are yet highly important in themselves; and therefore we shall go over the ground again. When we regard creation as only possible, man is viewed, of course, as not yet actually existent: he is only to be. He exists in the ideas of the Supreme Mind, and there only. And when, postulating man, we speak of the cause of man's existence, we must look to Happiness, and the resulting Goodness. But when we have in aspect man as really existing; and God's dealing with man, the reality: we take in another attribute, that, to wit, of Justice. I say, we take in the Justice of GOD; not merely His Truth. Yet, doubtless, the Justice of God involves the Truth of God.^b

§ 11. And, in the same way, when we regard God as the Just God, man is held as created; not, to be created. GOD created man:^c and He acts towards man, the real existence, not only as the Good One, who conserves the creatures He brought into being,^d but as the Just GOD, who must act

^a See Lemma I. ^b See § 3 of Dem. of Prop. III.

^c Schol. after Sub Prop. under Prop. I. Div. III.; in conjunction with Schol. after Part III. Div. II.

^d Dem. preced. Sect. 3, 4.

towards each man as he truly is, and who, therefore, must render to every man according to his state of mind, and resulting works; the good man being treated as being so, and the bad man being treated as such.^a

§ 12. To go over the ground once more. The question concerning creation can have no reference to the attribute of Justice. But it refers to Goodness. The fields of the two attributes are, so far, entirely distinct.

§ 13. Truth and Justice, as in GOD, have, thus, nought to do with creation. Yea, these attributes require, not a possible creation, but the creature as an accomplished fact,^b as the field for their exercise. *GOD is Just = GOD is Just to creatures, or at least to men.*^c It is never to be forgotten, that the Good One, who creates, conserves man; and, as Conserver or Preserver, has, therefore, to do with man as a real existence.^d

§ 14. There is one thing which must be admitted,—and which (if our conceptions were capacious and clear) should be borne in mind,—that 'tis somewhat different with regard to Truth, from what strictly holds with regard to Justice. Truth may be conceived to be occupied, not only concerning creaturely intelligences other than men, for instance, angelic spirits; but (in the case of those who hold the orthodox and catholic doctrine of the Trinity) concerning uncreated natures, namely, the Second and the Third Hypostases of the GOD-HEAD.^e Justice, however,—Justice in, at any rate, its essential aspects,—can be exercised only in the case of creaturely objects; that is, as far as our demonstration is concerned, only with regard to human beings.^c

^a Prop. III. Dem. § 8, *multisque aliis locis*.

^b 'As in Sect. 10, 11, above.

^c Div. III. Prop. III. Lemma I. § 2. ^d Dem. preced.

^e Div. III. Prop. II. Lemma I. Sect. 4, 5, 6.

SCHOLIUM III.

§ 1. A question was reserved^a for this place ; the question, to wit, Will the Rewards of the Righteous, and the Punishment of the Wicked, continue for ever ? And, on a first view, it appears as if, in this quarter of our *a priori* horizon, the question might be decided very easily. For the Love of God, founded on His Goodness, being in the field of argument, as now to be postulated, what great difficulty can there be ?

§ 2. We have seen^b what is the decision, upon the matter in hand, of the attribute of Justice, the origin, this, of so many prominent and differential *masculine* characteristics. Justice cannot decide *whether* the rewards of the righteous, and the punishments of the wicked, shall last for ever, *or not*. Nor can this Attribute even decide *how long* the rewards and the punishments shall last, taking for granted that they shall be finite in duration. Justice says nothing on these points.^c It informs us, that impartial retributions shall be inflexibly and accurately administered to every man, ‘according to his works;’ whether in this world, or in the next world:^d Justice does not inform us how long the men themselves will live ; whether for a very long time, or without end. Justice did not make the men begin to be : Justice does not conserve them : This attribute has nought to do with such matters.^e

§ 3. But is the same decision to be come to by the attribute of Love ? Love, on one, at least, of its sides, the seat, as it were, of the *femininism* of Deity, the source, consequently, of the *feminine* excellencies of our race. Does Love

^a See § 12 of Schol. IV. Prop. III.

^b Prop. III. Schol. IV. ^d *Ibid.* § 14, &c.

^c *Ibid.* § 19, &c.

^e Schol. preced. Sect. 12, 13, &c.

answer the question with the same, *I know not : it “is not in” me ?*^a Surely, one need not be reckoned over hasty who would at once say, No : Love must reply with a difference.

§ 4. As far as the Rewards of the Righteous are concerned, there will be no difficulty at all, from any quarter. The ground of the decision here is clear ; the decision itself easy. Goodness called the men into being :^b Love preserves them :^c In the spiritual world, or in heaven, good men will be only *more like* God than they were when they lived on earth :^d On the whole, therefore, the answer must be, It is certain, that the men will exist for ever. All the causes of their existence, and conservation, are at work. And no inexorable attribute demands, or even seems to demand, aught else to be accomplished. The Righteous, then, will continue for ever and ever. They are attached, by strong connecting links, to the throne¹ of God. As God liveth, they shall live also.† Starsuns, they shall shine ceaselessly in the Eternal Empyrean.‡

§ 5. Such is the answer to the question, so far as the one class of men is concerned.

§ 6. But what is the answer which is to be returned as to the other class ? A very different sort of men are the Righteous from the Wicked, and a very different solution must be accorded as to the case of these latter. The true gist of the whole question, as one of difficulty, is undoubtedly in this direction.

^a See § 19 of Schol. IV. Prop. III. ^b Sub. Prop. Div. III.

^c Prop. IV. Dem. sect. 5 & 9.

^d See § 11 & § 13, Schol. III.; and § 14 to § 17, Schol. IV., both in Prop. III. ;—and other places.

¹In explanation of the employment of anthropomorphic (or, for that matter, anthropopathic) language, see the contents of a former note : viz. Note (¹ p. 31) to § 11, Schol. III. Prop. III.

† See Note to this Scholium : Note A.

‡ See Note to this Scholium : Note B.

§ 7. Will the Punishment of the Wicked be for ever? Or, as we might *now* put the question, without just offence to the unalterable laws of logic, Will GOD punish sinners eternally? This, then, is the question; and there can be no doubt, that this is a fearfully momentous question for sinners to ask, and to have answered for them. The great reason is, of course, because of the tremendous weight attached to one of the terms in the query: "for ever," or "eternally," or whatsoever the word, or rather words, may-hap the phrase, may be. Whatever was the case at first, with regard to the equivalent terms, or rather expressions, in the original Greek and Hebrew languages—from which source the current Christian meaning was doubtless taken; the term *has come* to have a most particularly emphatic meaning *with us*. By "eternal" existence, as employed in this question, the ordinary superficial Christian of the day means (tho' perhaps he knows it not) an existence enduring alongside of, and coincident with, the duration of the existence of GOD Himself: *true co-existence*. I would avoid enlarging, on the present occasion, on this portentous topic; but, nevertheless, I cannot omit to suggest a reflection: Only think of the full significance of that affirmation which attaches the miserable damnation of the wicked in hell—and, consequently, infernal blasphemies, the absolute acme of all evil—to the "glorious high throne"¹ of the Eternal: which binds up the existence of *evil*, and the existence of GOD, in one indissoluble attachment. I speak not of the accumulation of horrors, to every member of the universe, implied in the dreadful position: But in what sense can GOD be the *One Living One*, if an antagonistic element, centred in a monstrous Monarch, be bound up with the *Eternity to come* as much as GOD Himself? For, no condition of things, even hellish, can exist

¹ These words, so apposite, are from Jeremiah xxvii. 12.

without the shadow at least of a government. No kingdom without a king. Even an abhorred kingdom of darkness could not maintain itself through one of the days, nights and ages, of hell, without its appallingly "hateful and hating" + ~~harm~~

§ 7. But as a teaching on the immense signification covered by one of the terms of that query, I have been betrayed into viewing like a proleptical objection to the doctrine itself of Eternal Torments. Yet it must be remembered that, whatever be implied in the position, The torments of the damned shall be to all eternity: our inquiry at present is really this. Is the doctrine true? Whatever be involved in the fundamental idea of the junction of such a predicate to such a subject. Is the proposition itself true, or false: to be accepted, or rejected?

§ 8. What great difficulty can there be, after all, in deciding the question?

§ 10. Namely, what difficulty can there be in deciding, that those attributes of Goodness and Love will be always ~~exigen~~: it demanding that, if possible, the torments of the miserable damned should be made to cease to be: While not one of the other Attributes, as demonstrated, necessitates, or even seems to necessitate, the everlasting continuance of the misery of those

poor damned bodies.‡

Not one of the other Attributes certainly, if not Inflexible Justice.

§ 11. If, then, the misery be to come to an end, *How* (say you) shall the misery come to its end? Who can tell? and it is not necessary that any one should know. Enough, if we know that Inflexible Justice is silent, while Divine

† See Note to this Scholium: Note C.

‡ See Note to this Scholium: Note D.

Love unceasingly pleads and prays for the cessation, *as soon as possible*, of all the unutterable wretchedness in the wide domains of GOD. Enough is it for the good to know so much: and humbly must they wait "in hope"¹ for that consummation, the greatest, and the last, of all the creaturely consummations. For, by that consummation, "the whole "creation," which, so visibly and pitifully, "groaneth and "travaileth in pain together until now,"² shall, finally, "be "delivered from the bondage of corruption."³ In fine, "Then the end."⁴ and "GOD" shall be "all in all."⁵

§ 12. But though no one can tell, in a positive way, or dogmatically, how the misery is to come to its end; one may surmise how the misery will end. The misery will end: But very likely not by the ceasing to be of the evil, or (to give the proper term) the wickedness, abstractly taken—the cause of all the misery. For, no way of ending evil is patent, or even comprehensible, so long as the wicked themselves remain. The tree must first be made good before the fruit.† It seems, indeed, a moral proposition as certain as any in metaphysical science, or mathematical, that the wicked will not cease from troubling even in hell: (whatever they may be compelled to be, or not to do, in the grave.)‡ But, at all events, the wickedness, and its effect, the misery, might be made to cease to be, by an Almighty fiat, commanding the wickedness, *with its subject*, to cease to be.^a That Power which called all men into being can cause men to be no more:^a could cause all the things of Time itself to be no longer, and that in the very fullest of senses.|| The ques-

^a Lemma II.

¹ Rom. viii. 20.

² *Ibid.* v. 22.

³ *Ibid.* v. 21.

⁴ 1 Cor. xv. 24.

⁵ *Ibid.* v. 28.

† See Note to this Scholium: Note E.

‡ See Note to this Scholium: Note F.

|| See Note to this Scholium: Note G.

tion is solely about the exercise of the ability. The annihilation of the wicked in hell is quite possible to the Creator. At Some of the Attributes demand it: None say. Nay: the wickedness, and the misery,—multiplied into each other, and increasing in more than any geometrical ratio,—must last for ever. The final annihilation, therefore, is possible: And possible, it is certain.

§ 13. Thus, the final annihilation of the wicked, is a doctrine from which there is no escaping. It is a doctrine of reason, and it is, therefore, in perfect accord with the reasonings of the Argument, *a priori*.

§ 14. Not the philosophically-sounding annihilation, however, but the morally-characteristic “destruction” is the Scriptural expression, to denote the awful utter close of the career of wicked men. I do not seek to found any statement, in a demonstrative work, upon the testimony of a Bible-writer, or upon any authority whatsoever: but as I am here but surmising, and not laying down the law apodictically,^b writers in the Bible are entitled to be heard, as well as, and as much as, any author could be, even taking that low ground wherfrom the authors of the books in The Book are viewed as purely human authorities. “Destruction,” I repeat, is the ordinary Scriptural expression; though, occasionally, we meet with the idea in even stronger words or phrases: such as, “everlasting destruction” from the presence of the Lord, and from the glory of his “power.”^c Everlasting destruction, indeed, just because “from the presence of the Lord,” the “express image” of the person (*versus*)^d of Him “who only”^e “hath Life in Himself.”^f the sole source of life to all the creatures.||

^a Lemma II.

^b See above, § 12.

^c 2 Thess. i. 9. ^d Heb. i. 3. ^e 1 Timothy vi. 16. ^f John v. 26.

[†] See Note to this Scholium: Note H.

[‡] See Note to this Scholium: Note I.

^{||} See Note to this Scholium: Note J.

NOTES
TO
THE ARGUMENT, *A PRIORI*,
FOR THE
MORAL ATTRIBUTES
OF
G O D.



NOTES TO DIVISION III.

NOTE TO PROPOSITION I.

NOTE TO SCHOLIUM AFTER SUB-PROPOSITION.

It is not from inadvertence that I am here silent on the subject of specific etymological authorities.

See the third note in the "Advertisement to the Fourth [or Russel] Edition" of "The Necessary Existence of God."

NOTES TO PROPOSITION II.

NOTE TO PROLEGOMENON II.

The two meanings of our one English word, *True*; alleged as it is to be of Anglo-Saxon, and even Gothic descent;† are preserved, because distinguished, in the Latin adjectives, *Verus* and *Verax*.

A Scottish Dissenting Divine, who is characterized by a much more than ordinary measure of good sense, has many excellent things to say, in his account of the Attributes. In one of his prelections on the "Doctrines of Theology," he has a Lecture "On God: His Truth and Faithfulness." The Divine in question commences his prelection in the following manner: "I proceed now to consider the truth and faithfulness of God. When we call him the true God, we distinguish him from those to whom this designation has been improperly given, and affirm, that he has not only the name, but the nature and perfections of God. 'The idols of the nations are silver and gold, but our God is in the heavens.' When we call him the God of truth, our design is not to assert his Divinity, but to illustrate his character; and we declare that an undeviating regard to truth marks all his communications to mankind," &c. Thus the Rev. Dr John Dick, Professor of Theology to the United Secession Church, in Lecture xxvi. It may be mentioned, once for all, that, in quoting from this

† See "Examination" of *Antitheos*: Part V. Sect. 22, 23, 24.

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It is also to maintain what constitutes personal in this country. It is not true to say that this is the trend of "Justice" in America. This is the trend of the other men in trusts of the country. These men are still in trust to allow them to lay the foundation of the country upon the constitution of Justice.)

7. 17. 2011

The difference between the absolute attitudes and the relative ones can be easily understood, although not much will be made of it here. It is quite possible to have indifference in almost any case, even though it would be difficult to find such indifference explanations that have not been given a definite position in question.

Consequently, if Δ is a \mathbb{Z} -module, then $\Delta \otimes \mathbb{Z}_p$ is \mathbb{Z}_p -torsion free.

אנו בדורנו

• That the Supreme Being and Author of all things, must be True and Good, is all his Decisions and all his Promises; is most evident. For the only Positive Reason of Fulfilling, is either *Rashness* or *Hope/faith*, *Innocency* or *Iniquity*, *Fear of Evil*, or *Hope of*

Gain; From all which, an Infinitely *Wise*, *All-sufficient*, and *Good* Being, must of Necessity be infinitely removed; And consequently, as 'tis impossible for him *to be deceived himself*, so neither is it possible for him in any wise to deceive Others. In a Word: All Evil and all Imperfections whatsoever, arise plainly either from *Shortness of Understanding*, *Defect of Power*, or *Faultiness of Will*; And this last, evidently from some *Impotency*, *Corruption*, or *Depravation*; being nothing else, but a direct Choosing to Act contrary to the known Reason and Nature of Things. From all which, it being manifest that the Supreme Cause and Author of all Things, cannot but be infinitely removed; it follows undeniably, that he must of Necessity be a *Being of Infinite Justice and Truth*.—Dr Samuel Clarke's "Demonstration" under Prop. XII.: cited as in Edit. 1728.

This passage, from the so celebrated performance of the great Rector of St James's, may make its appearance again. It is introduced here, on one account; and, as part perhaps of a larger quotation, it may be made use of afterwards, to serve a wider purpose. The passage cited is one of the most cogent in the "Demonstration;" and, with the entire context, is a superior place in a work abounding in excellent and admirable passages.

NOTE TO COROLLARY FROM PROPOSITION II.

In *illustration* of our *doctrine*, the following, from our respectable Scotch Professor, may be presented. "There are engagements with men into which God has entered." "His truth in relation to these is properly called *faithfulness*."—Dick's Lectures, vol. ii. p. 7.

NOTES TO PROPOSITION III.

NOTE TO LEMMA III.: NOTE A.

Cicero says, in more places than one,† There is no assertion so extravagant as not to have been made by some philosopher; and there is no proposition so monstrous as not to have been made by some theologian or other. Theologues, in turn, have set forth the most outrageous positions. They have not always declined to utter very "hard speeches"

† See "Examination" of *Antitheos*: Part VI. § 41.

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and the Rev. Dr. Dick, however, a great success. The book is to be a valuable one. Would you allow the Rev. Dr. Dick, before home, any liberty to do what a man has a right to do in his conscience?—and to do it with the greatest torments, even to the point of self destruction? He has a great Number of friends, and a large while Dr. Dick proceeds with his book, the influence is to last. This influence—such a wretched influence is substituted for the true & upright terms—this absolute justice of God, & the true & upright terms of the gospel:—which, however, the lowest & meanest in his estimation, & to a punishment the most recent? The Rev. Dr. Dick, in his book, Dr. Dick's Theophilus, says, "The love of the world is." But if it is the highest principle of the gospel? But if it is the highest principle of the gospel, then the monstrous proposition of the Justice of God, in his book, is his own. Dr. Dick, in his book, with such theology, is trying, in every sense, and for every reason, that God might be the author of everlasting misery upon an innocent creature. If the Rev. Dr. Dick, does not alter the nature of his book, I will expose him, and I would ask them, who are friends to Dr. Dick, to meet the innocents in the gospel, & tell them, if there is Justice, I will say, WHAT is it? For it is not right from the other! Surely they themselves, when they make use of a term in a sense different from what in all other cases it conveys! In short, the Rev. Dr. Dick, of the same school, in simply use terms in sense different from what they convey. This is a strange fact, though far from it, is very strange indeed, that a theologian could be so ignorant of the meaning that the Justice of God "regards not the person, but the object;" very strange, when one only knows the object, & nothing else but the object, accomplishes nothing, but insults the object of His face. The fact in reality accomplishes nothing, but deprives the depraved perceptions, in moral matters, of a sound and right philosophy, in fundamental regards. It is to be noticed that the Rev. Dr. Dick's book does not meet the whole of Theophilus Gale's immense work; the wrong

Chapter is put down: and perhaps Theophilus Gale, the Divine, has received but scrimp justice.

This philosophic and learned Divine was one of the Nonconformist band of mighty men of renown of the first portion of the second half of the 17th century. His once celebrated and well-known work, "The Court of the Gentiles," is brimful of every kind of philosophic speculation, and of the linguistical learning of that period; a period not deficient in knowledge of Platonic mysteries, nor in Hebrew and Greek scholarship. As was usual, this Divine was accustomed to make many, nice, and subtle distinctions: distinctions, oftentimes, too numerous, over-refined, and super-subtile. In particular, Theophilus Gale distinguished, in a strong, if not also a strange, manner, the Absolute Justice from relative, or ordinary Justice, designated, by this great Nonconformist writer, "Ordinate" Justice.

We shall set down the passage cited by the United Secession Divine, as it is in the original, "Court of the Gentiles;" and, after it, another passage, occurring a few pages back in that vast work, shall be produced for the sake of a comparison. The reader, fond of antiquity, will be gratified by the approach to a *fac-simile*.

"God's *Absolute Justice* is founded on the infinite perfection of his Essence, and has one and the same Idea with his Soverain Dominion over his Creature. For so great is the Majestie of God, and so *Absolute* his Dominion, as that he is obnoxious to no Laws, Obligations, or Ties from his Creature: this *Absolute Justice* or Dominion regards not any qualities or conditions of its object; but God can by virtue hereof inflict the highest torments on his innocent Creature, and exempt from punishment the most *nocent*. *By this Absolute Justice and Dominion God can inflict the greatest torments, even of Hell itself, on the most innocent Creature.* For every Creature as such is subordinate to God both in *suffering*, as well as *doing* what he pleaseth."—Part IV. Book ii. ch. 6. § 1. [not, ch. 5. § 4.]

The previous passage, which was promised, is as follows: "The *Impossibles*, which regard God himself *absolutely*, are all such as are simply repugnant to the Divine Essence. As God cannot deceive or be deceived: he cannot sin, or be the moral cause of sin: he cannot condemn or punish, (though he may afflict yea torment) the innocent, or justifie the wicked without a satisfaction."—Part IV. Book ii. ch. 5. § 4.—Let him who can reconcile the places, by bringing the statements into exactest harmony

NOTES TO DIVISION III.

After exhausting the subject of the absolute Justice, Gale passes on to "Ordinate Justice;" and he writes: *Ordinate Justice* "has a necessary relation to some quality in its object, in this or that manner received or constituted; which quality being supposed, its egressus or execution on its object is necessary, not by any *physic* necessitie of nature, but by a *moral* necessitie or natural congruitie," &c.—Chap. 6.

And while the ordinate Justice is treated of, one meets with such startling announcements as this: "Many things that are unjust with man, are just with God."—*Ibid.*

So we see, that 'tis no such new device to ascribe upon God, what would be too immoral to be charged upon a man, who shall die. What would have been scandalously bad in a mortal man, was thought good enough to be ascribed to man's Maker. Some of those Puritan Divines, meeting with some of the Jesuits, had a principle broad and wide enough to receive propositions which seemed to oppose each other, and conclusions which shocked the deepest-seated instincts, and the finest susceptibilities, of the universal human nature.

Is this of that old, and now antiquated divinity worthy of the admiration which some people of a later age are never tired of bestowing? In short, where is the man who, with such theology as this of *God* before him, dare contend that the science itself of Theology could never progress, in any of its departments?

NOTE TO LEMMA III.: NOTE B.

In a former note,† it was hinted that the distinction between *absolute* and *relative* attributes, was not always well handled. And in fact not *absolute* knowledge has been vented, both in this region, and in the *theological* region, to the *deceitful* or *deceivers* from it.

"The justice of God has," says our excellent Dr. Dick, "been vulgarized into absolute and relative, universal and particular. By the former is understood the rectitude of his nature, which leads him to command us to do what is right and equal; and the latter respects the administration of a moral Governor, who will render to his subjects according to their desert. I do not see very clearly the nature of this distinction, which is not satisfactorily explained by those who use it; but this is clear: *An absolute justice is expressive of what he*

is in himself, but relative justice considers him as standing in certain relations to his creatures, and acting according to the law which he has given to them."—*Lectures*, vol. i. p. 451.

The Doctor finds fault with the distinction as set forth by others, and gives his own explanation of the force of the distinction. But (to omit reference to the others) the Doctor is himself grievously at fault; for, in reality, there can be no Justice but one sort. All Justice is necessarily relative—to its objects, its own objects. Un-relative Justice would be a chimera.

NOTE TO SCHOLIUM I.: NOTE A.

Nearly the same perhaps as the Hebrew חָכָם, or מְבוֹב, when the latter is applied to mind: The same too as the Greek Testament Ἀγαθός, as occasionally applied to the Great Mind.

NOTE TO SCHOLIUM I.: NOTE B.

Frequently in the New Testament Scriptures, the term in question—*i.e.* ἀγαθός—is used in this latter way.

NOTE TO SCHOLIUM II.

It is thus that a writer of the day speaks of Butler, and of his work. "There are many writers of our Church" (the Episcopal Church of Great Britain) "who might be named as belonging to this class of God's servants, to whom intellect has been given, and [whose intellect] has been used under the guidance of God's Holy Spirit. We might name especially Butler, whose immortal work, the *Analogy*, is perhaps the most precious offering of human sagacity in the cause of Christian truth."—"The Christian Life," by the Very Rev. Dean Ramsay. (Edinburgh, 1862). Page 151.—(Some such words as those within the brackets are awanting.)

NOTE TO SCHOLIUM III.: NOTE A.

The word quoted is taken from a passage in St Paul's Epistle to the Galatians. See Galat. v. 17. From whatever point of view the affair we looked at, 'tis surely allowable to illustrate a great fact in ethics,

by taking the assistance afforded by any well-known author; for we would not be understood to look in the direction of *authority*.

The same sort of remark will be applicable to other cases; perhaps, to almost every other case where a Scriptural phrase may happen to be employed.

NOTE TO SCHOLIUM III.: NOTE B.

See Romans vii. 13. It is for the thoughtful reader to determine how far the reasoning in the text corresponds with the train of thought of the great Apostle of the Gentiles.

NOTE TO SCHOLIUM III.: NOTE C.

As one saith, Death itself shall be cast into the lake of fire, which shall consume all the brood of Sin, the monster, mother of all evil. Last of all, Death, the mother's great heir, shall be consumed. As another hath it, The last enemy that shall be annihilated is this Death:

NOTE TO SCHOLIUM IV.: NOTE A.

"But, as *divine punishment is what men chiefly object against, and are most unwilling to allow*, it may be proper to mention some circumstances in the natural course of punishments at present, which are analogous to what religion teaches us concerning a future state of punishment; indeed so analogous, that as they add a farther credibility to it, so they cannot but raise a most serious apprehension of it in those who will attend to them."—*Butler's "Analogy:" Part I., Chap. ii.*

Divine Punishment is what is chiefly objected to: men are generally most unwilling to allow it! No doubt. Is the unwillingness at all surprising? Punishment, for a short time, or for a very long time, is itself disagreeable: and there is something pleasant in objecting to the doctrine, at all events, which enforces the Punishment. But Reward is quite another thing; and, accordingly, the doctrine of Reward, in perpetuity, or not in perpetuity, raises no difficulty. Nobody can be punished for saying, to himself, that Reward (whether or no the attendant Righteousness) may lie in his road, and fall to his share. Reward is, at the least, something to be gotten; and the idea of an acquisition, accompanied by no drawback, offends few indeed.

NOTE TO SCHOLIUM IV.: NOTE B.

The words quoted are taken from Professor Macdougall's Review of the original "Argument, *a priori*." See last note in *Preface* to "Examination," in the *Russel* edition of "The Necessary Existence of GOD." (Page 126.)

NOTE TO SCHOLIUM IV.: NOTE C.

These words are from our Hume's "Dialogues concerning Natural Religion," and from the Part to be specified in the next note. The work just named, though not the most important, is yet, albeit posthumous, the most perfect, of the works of the great Scotch metaphysician. Kant, himself an object of idolatry to many of the Continental philosophers (as well as to a few of the Island ones), had an unbounded admiration for Hume. The metaphysician of Königsberg remarked (and the remark became famous) that the Edinburgh philosopher it was who wakened the mind of Europe from its dogmatical slumber: rousing men to the mighty efforts which culminated in "The Critic of Pure Reason." The Germans being the judges, our countryman has taken his place in the very topmost rank of Mental Philosophers.

NOTE TO SCHOLIUM IV.: NOTE D.

It is singular—no, it is not singular—that Dr Samuel Clarke, the *a priori* arguer, should no sooner touch on *a posteriori* ground, even in his "Demonstration" itself, than he falls into the beaten track. At the end of the demonstration of his 12th and last Proposition, which concerns the Infinite Moral Perfections, the following paragraph meets the eye.—

"To this Argumentation *a priori*, there can be opposed but one Objection that I know of, drawn on the contrary *a posteriori*, from Experience and Observation of the Unequal Distributions of Providence in the World. But (besides the just Vindication of the Wisdom and Goodness of Providence in its Dispensations, even with Respect to this *Present* World only, which *Plutarch* and other Heathen Writers have judiciously made,†) the Objection it self is entirely wide of the

† Heathen writers! In the name of Heaven, is it the case that, in the 18th century of Christianity, a Christian author, anxiously desirous of vindicating Providence, was obliged to fall back upon what "Plutarch and other Heathen Writers" did, in their essays to justify the ways of the Gods of Polytheism to man! "The idols [or gods] of

Question. For concerning the Justice and Goodness of God, (as of any Governour whatsoever,) no Judgment is to be made from a partial View of a few small Portions of his Dispensations, but from an entire Consideration of the Whole; And consequently, not only the short Duration of this present State, but moreover all that is past *and that is still to come, must be taken into the Account*: And Then every thing will clearly appear just and right."

Alas! that Dr Samuel Clarke should so signally have forgotten, that he had not previously proved, either *a posteriori*, or *a priori*, the existence of any future state at all. The subsumed secret postulation of such, is, therefore, no more than a sadly, or rather ridiculously, "baseless fabric."

David Hume has shown this, once and for ever. Bishop Warburton, with his wonted acuteness, perceived the folly of the procedure; and Professor Hengstenberg, the celebrated theological commentator, in the Lutheran interest, has repeated the condemnation of the procedure: but the celebrity of the first of the three is the greatest, and we shall content ourselves with the observation as in his words.

Here is the *thesis*, as delivered by one of the interlocutors, in the famous "Dialogues":—"This world is but a point in comparison of the universe; this life but a moment in comparison of eternity. The present evil phenomena, therefore, are *rectified* in other regions, and *in some future period of existence*."

And here is the weighty *antithesis*, as given by another of the interlocutors:—"Whence can any cause be known but from its *known* effects? Whence can any hypothesis be proved but from the *apparent* phenomena? To establish one hypothesis upon another, is *building entirely in the air*."—Part X.

Warburton has immortalized that kind of building, by applying to it (as he understood how to do) the well-known Spanish witticism about castles *not on the ground*. And 'tis a little curious, that the illustrious Prussian Bible-critic should have followed the lead of the English satiric theologian, in depreciating, and in even deprecating, the architecture of the Spanish *chateaus*, known as "castles in the air."

the nations are silver and gold :" and only think of a Christian writer appealing to the blinded worshippers of those that were "no Gods," in order that he might have somewhat to urge on the side of the Providence of His God! Of whom it was declared by one of His true worshippers, more than two thousand years agone, and hundreds of years before Plutarch saw the light,—" Our God is in the Heavens."

NOTE TO SCHOLIUM IV.: NOTE E.

“When, conformably to what religion teaches us, God shall reward and punish virtue and vice, as such, so as that every one shall, upon the whole, have his deserts, this DISTRIBUTIVE JUSTICE† will not be a thing different in *kind*, but only in *degree*, from what we experience in his present government. It will be that in *effect*, toward which we now see a *tendency*. It will be no more than the *completion* of that moral government, the *principles and beginning* of which have been shown, beyond all dispute, discernible in the present constitution and course of nature.”—*Bishop Butler*: “*Analogy*,” Part I. Chap. iii.

NOTE TO SCHOLIUM IV.: NOTE F.

Bishop Butler observes, with his usual shrewdness:—“Some good men may, perhaps, be offended, with hearing it spoken of as a supposable thing, that the future punishments of wickedness may be in the way of natural consequence; as if this were taking the execution of justice out of the hands of God, and giving it to nature.” *Analogy*: Part II. Ch. v. And the Bishop soon goes on to remove the offence. He remarks: “Since it must be admitted, that the future punishment of wickedness is *not a matter of arbitrary appointment, but of reason, equity, and justice*; it comes, for aught I see, to the same thing, whether it is supposed to be inflicted in a way analogous to that in which the temporal punishments of vice and folly are inflicted, or in any other way. And though there were a difference, it is allowable in the present case to make this supposition, plainly not an incredible one, That future punishment may follow wickedness in the way of natural consequence or according to some general laws of government already established, in the universe.”—*Ibid.*

† In this case, and possibly some other cases, the capitals are the present author's.

NOTES TO PROPOSITION IV.

NOTE TO DEMONSTRATION: NOTE A.

“ The Supreme Being finds eternal rest and satisfaction in himself. The well-springs of his happiness are in his own nature: even his infinite understanding can conceive nothing greater and more excellent; and of everything external he is so independent as not to be affected by its existence or annihilation. In the possession of his own resources, he is consummately and permanently blessed; and hence the Scripture calls him the happy God, the happy and only Potentate, the Being who has in himself an inexhaustible store of felicity.”—*Dick: Lecture xx.* vol. i. p. 363.

NOTE TO DEMONSTRATION: NOTE B.

“ Had not the Divine nature been communicative, God would have remained for ever alone; but now he beholds from his throne a scale of beings, ascending from the insect and the worm to the seraph and the archangel, all rejoicing in conscious existence, and partaking of the riches of his liberality. The eternal fountain has overflowed, and the universe is refreshed and gladdened by its stream. It is the saying of a heathen philosopher, that when God was about to make the world, he transformed himself into love.”—*Dick: Lecture xxv.* vol. i. p. 431.

NOTE TO DEMONSTRATION: NOTE C.

“ The preservation of all things”—our Dr Dick informs us—“ has been called a continual creation. The idea intended is, that as their existence is dependent, it is prolonged from moment to moment by the same power which created them at first.”—*Lecture xxiii.* vol. i. p. 419

NOTE TO DEMONSTRATION: NOTE D.

“ Love is the same with benevolence or good will, a desire for the happiness of others giving rise to the use of due means for accomplishing it.”—*Dick: Lecture xxiv.* vol. i. p. 444.

NOTE TO DEMONSTRATION: NOTE E.

A friend, who has an extremely delicate perception in many spiritual matters, has directed my attention to a place in *The Divine Comedy*, as containing thoughts in unison with matter occurring in several of the sections in this demonstration. 'Tis, I allow, adjoining immortal verse to mortal prose to use the great Italian Poem in this connection. The lines referred to occur in the 28th Canto of the *Paradise*; and they shall be produced as mauled and mangled in the blank verse of our British Cary. No blank verse, perhaps, could meet the exigencies of that poetry in the *terza rima*, and the translator into English, without rhyme, must frequently expose the inadequacy of his organ.

Every orb,
 Corporeal, doth proportion its extent
 Unto the virtue through its parts diffus'd.
THE GREATER BLESSEDNESS PRESERVES THE MORE.
 The greater is the body (if all parts
 Share equally) the more is to preserve.
 Therefore the circle, whose swift course enwheels
 The universal frame, answers to that
 Which is supreme in knowledge and in love.
 Thus by the virtue, not the seeming breadth
 Of substance, measuring, thou shalt see the heav'ns,
 Each to th' intelligence that ruleth it,
Greater to more, and smaller unto less,
Suited in strict and wondrous harmony.

NOTE TO DEMONSTRATION: NOTE F.

Such places as John v. 20, may be considered with reference to the point at which, for the moment, we stand. The passage specified well deserves to be weighed in connection with the statements made, not omitting the mere hints dropt, in the text. A train of more than usually deep thoughts is likely to arise in the mind of the attentive reader; and, during the course of his reflections, the profound, and eminently important, position in that 20th verse, of the Fifth Chapter of St John's Gospel, to wit, **THE FATHER LOVETH THE SON**, will be likely to occur as deserving of the carefulest pondering.

The following passages, in the Gospel of the Apostle of Love, may be read in connection with the verse specified in the preceding paragraph: John, iii. 35; x. 17; xv. 9; xvii. 23, 24. These places speak *directly*

of the same love of the FATHER to the SON. Other places utter the same language, if one makes the proper deduction. *Ex gr.*, from John xvi. 27, the love of the FATHER to the SON may be drawn *indirectly*, or in virtue of a true consequence, to wit, a conclusion in conformity with the eternally valid laws of logic.

NOTE TO DEMONSTRATION: NOTE G.

Having attempted to *illustrate* the meaning of something contained in the preceding section by a reference to a place in the book men are agreed in calling the *New Testament*; possibly, it may be permitted to me to balance my procedure, and *illustrate* (for I should evitate the impropriety of seeking to *prove*) the point prominent in this section by a reference to a piece, of incomparable loveliness, occurring in our never-sufficiently-to-be-admired *Old Testament*. If the words (= ideas) of the New Testament are enshrined in the most powerful and yet beautiful of human languages; the older Hebrew writings can boast of passages of unsurpassable majesty, and sublimity, in combination with the most childlike simplicity and gracefulness. Despite the comparative impediment of the bonds of a Shemitic tongue ("lip"), the Hebrew writers burst through all obstacles, and, overleaping all bound, have forwarded to our age, and have left for every future generation which shall exist on the earth, the deathless examples of almost every kind of excellency of which a human speech is capable. If the Apostle of Love is immortal in the most pliant and self-sufficing of languages; no less is the man after GOD's own heart immortalized within those so stiff square characters which have been, and shall be to the end of time, the vehicle—or, more strictly, the source of all other vehicles—for the most profound prayers, and the most exalted praises, which ever were, or can be, addressed, by the church of the world, to the Heavenly Throne, or, rather, to Him who sitteth thereon, even the Holy, Holy, Holy, One, who is from eternity to eternity.†

And now for the piece which has been thus prefaced. The 145th Psalm may be given as a classical passage, of unextollable beauty and forcibleness, for the identification of Goodness and Love, as existing in the mind of JEHOVAH, and exhibited towards "the children of

† The intelligent reader will, without the least difficulty, bear in mind, that I am not arguing at present: nor assuming neither. I am only speaking (for those who have *ears*) from a certain stand-point, for a certain purpose, and for a certain time.

men" (verse 12). JEHOVAH's Goodness to all in creation (v. 9, &c.),—specifically, every living (= breathing) thing (v. 16); becomes raised to Love, when exhibited to men, or at least to the saints of JEHOVAH (= those who experimentally understand His benignity—v. 10), even those who reciprocally love Him (v. 20); as David himself, the inditer of this inimitable Psalm, loved his God, who was also his King. (Verses 1, 2, 5, 6, 21.)

In consonance with the view now advocated, the Anglo-Catholic Church, in her liturgical Psalter, translates the 9th verse, of the Psalm in question, (which King James's Bible renders, "The LORD is good to all: and his tender mercies are over all his works,") I say, translates the 9th verse in this way, *The LORD is loving unto every man: and his mercy is over all his works.* A fine instinct, which leaped to meet the author's idea, took a meaning to the original which the Hebrew words do not contain. A most true meaning of the Hebrew, nevertheless. Which statement will look wondrously like a paradox to many: even to the carnal-minded dwellers in the superficies of inspired terms; the superficial many, who deem themselves to be the only wise men, the sole (and too often soul-less) adepts in "*rational*" *criticism*.

NOTE TO SCHOLIUM I.: NOTE A.

"Fichte, by his subjective idealism, had banished from the realms of existence both Nature and God, reducing everything to the all-engrossing Ego."—From the article "*Pantheists*" in "The Faiths of the World," by Dr James Gardner. The work in question is a most useful compend; containing a vast body of information about all sorts of Churches, Sects, and individual Sectaries. Nor are systems of Philosophy, and Philosophers themselves, neglected.

NOTE TO SCHOLIUM I.: NOTE B.

"We see no very great reason, but that in a rectified and qualified sense this may pass for true theology, that Love is the Supreme Deity and Original of all things; namely, if by it be meant eternal, self-originated, intellectual Love, or essential and substantial goodness, that having an infinite overflowing fulness and fecundity dispenses itself uninvitishly, according to the best wisdom, sweetly governs all, without any force or violence (all things being naturally subject to its authority, and readily obeying its laws,) and reconciles the whole world

into harmony. For the Scripture telling us, that God is love, seems to warrant thus much to us, that love in some rightly qualified sense is God."—*Cudworth*: "True Intellectual System of the Universe." (Page 123.)—Book I. chap. iii. 18. And to the same effect, see also p 374, &c.

NOTE TO SCHOLIUM I.: NOTE C.

"I am persuaded," wrote one of those eminent men who, each in his own way, have completely altered the destinies of the world; "I am persuaded, that neither death, nor life, nor angels, nor principalities, nor powers, nor things present, nor things to come, nor height, nor depth, nor any other creature, shall be able to separate us from the love of God."—*Epistle to the Romans*: viii. 38, 39.

NOTE TO SCHOLIUM II.

No words so forcible as those of the Bible. What words could be better adapted to express the idea in the text than these: "For thus saith the high and lofty One who inhabiteth eternity, whose name is Holy; I dwell [or inhabit] in the high and holy place." (Isaiah lvii. 15.) The verb is the same in both clauses: עָשָׂה.—I do not overlook that Gesenius speaks of an ellipsis, translating the clause, in the verse, thus: "God יְהֹוָה who inhabits (the heavens) for ever". [Tregelles's Gesenius, page 823. (Bagsters; London, 1859.)] This way of it would come to pretty much the same thing. The difference would tell in my favour. Gesenius's translation would make God to be, not the Substratum of Eternity alone: but the Being underlying Immensity also. Just as, when king Solomon, speaking of, and to, the LORD GOD of Israel, declares, "Behold, heaven, and the heaven of heavens, cannot contain Thee;" the king's philosophy, underlying the popularly expressed words in the address, makes, in reality, GOD (ELOHIM) to be the Substance within the substance, not only of these heavens, but of the more ethereal, or spiritual heavens underlying them, i.e., the visible heavens, or expansion (= the γῆρας of Genesis I. verses 6, 7, &c.): the expansion which, if not palpable to sense, is at any rate most palpable to our imagination and intellect. An expanse, not finite, which ourceptive powers cannot refuse to recognise.†

† See the very first Proposition of this "Argument." See, also, the expansion of the matter of that Proposition in the "Examination" of *Antitheos*, Part II. § 9 to § 16. Consult, likewise, Part I. § 25 to § 35.

That the philosophic king, and kingly philosopher,—the wisest of mortals he,†—did, in reality, consider that one heaven *stood under*, or was *substratum* or *substance* to, another heaven—the one within, and the other without (as it were);—cannot admit of well-founded doubt. The words of the original (1 Kings viii. 27) are: **שָׁמָיִם פְּנֵי הַשָּׁמָיִם** which are equal to the English, *the heavens, even the heavens of these heavens*. The noun is plural in each one of the three instances of its occurrence; and 'tis quite plain that the king, or the philosopher, (whichever term you like,) meant to lay down heavens within heavens; the outer heavens being the heavens of sense.

—He who has got, in his philosophy, natural, or spiritual, one heaven substratal to another; is advanced one step to the One Divine Being underlying all finite substances. *One, not as existing apart from, but as interpenetrating, and including, all other beings.*—

NOTE TO SCHOLIUM III.: NOTE A.

John xiv. 19, deserves to be weighed, as there is in it deep philosophy, as well as sound divinity. And deep philosophy and sound divinity do not always go together. Nay, cases have been known where philosophy, not uncommonly deep, and divinity, not so much deficient in sound as in sense; where, I say, the philosophy and the divinity did not agree at all. Not agreed, they did not walk well together.

NOTE TO SCHOLIUM III.: NOTE B.

The idea of the resemblance of the good,—the eminently excellent, or (as they were counted or called by Plato, and other philosophers) *heroic* souls,—to stars; was perfectly familiar to the ancients. Especially was the idea familiar to the minds of Easterns, whether Heathens, Jews, or Christians. As evidence, consult the 3rd verse of the twelfth chapter of Daniel, a book evidently full of allusions to all kinds of Orientalisms; as well as not a few other passages occurring both in the Old Testament, and in the New.

Those intimate with the writings of Origen, will recollect this (by no means always orthodox) Father's imaginations.

† For which, we have much more than apocryphal authority. See 1 Kings iii. 12, and 2 Chronicles I. 11 & 12.

Again, Dante, as representative of the lay, and uninspired element (if it be not almost a profanity to speak of such a poet as Dante as being uninspired, since the greatest of Italian poets was verily inspired, in all but the highest sense of inspiration;) Dante alone could furnish a whole magazine of allusions to stars, as resemblances to mental excellencies. Take a single instance.

As when the north blows from his milder cheek
 A blast, that scours the sky ; forthwith our air,
 Clear'd of the rack that hung on it before,
 Glitters; and with his beauties all unveil'd,
 The firmament looks forth serene, and smiles :
 Such was my cheer, when Beatrice drove
 With clear reply, the shadows back, and TRUTH
Was manifested, AS A STAR in heaven.

—“Paradise:” Canto xxviii.

Some philosophers, deeply tainted with Oriental biases, of a particular complexion, went the length of absolutely identifying the great men of the earth with the astral bodies. There is a good deal, tending in this direction, in Plato. This far-travelling Greek drew, in all likelihood, the matter of his philosophy, of this kind, from the source of the old Chaldee star-worship, or worship of the host of heaven (Sabaism = Tsebaism : from **אֲבוֹת**, a host, or multitude.) The astronomical observations, made in the highlands of Mesopotamia, (a region blessed with “starry skies,”) which led, in time, to astrology, and, ultimately, to star-worship, and to worship of the heavenly firmament, or expanse (**עַמְקָר**) itself,—indications of which latter we find in that very place in Daniel, and, in the most undoubted and abundant way, in Cicero’s *De Naturâ Deorum*;—these constituted a branch of learning with which all the Magi met with in the Bible were profoundly acquainted.

Every student of Latin history will remember what the Romans of the times of the Emperors did to their masters; cruel tyrants, or mildly-ruling princes, as the case might be. Through the gross adulation, founded on the real fears, of these later Romans, their despots came all to take, at last, their places in the heavens. The degenerate Romans swore by the *genius* of the (reigning) Emperor, who, as soon as dead, assumed his place in the firmament, and became a star, recognised indeed on earth, tho’ unknown in the heavens themselves.

But allowing liberally for all sorts of errors, there yet remains a fixed residuum of truth; and we may pronounce, that the notion of the resemblance of the good among men to stars shining in the heavenly

expanse, must have a stable foundation among the radical interior perceptions of the human mind.—See Job, xxxviii. 7; Jude, 13.

NOTE TO SCHOLIUM III. : NOTE C.

Titus iii. 3. The quintessence of a true description of Satan's sons is in these pregnant words, *hated = hateful, and hating*. The Devil's child could not have, in less compass, a better mark of his sonship.

And what is so true of the offspring, is true of the "father." The rigorous, universal laws of hereditary descent determine, the child being given, the quality of the paternity : as well as, given the father, ("the Devil"), the nature of the filiation.

NOTE TO SCHOLIUM III. : NOTE D.

Once on a time, when a certain individual was alleging that Robert Burns was a true prophet, as well as a great poet ; in virtue of a conjunction of qualities which always takes place in the case of the greatest poets, whereby the world has a real *Vates* ; a clergyman present was heard to ask, How was the Scotch poet a prophet ? What did he prophesy ?

The clergyman was, perhaps, of more than an average stamp, as to abilities and acquirements : yet one feels ashamed at recording an anecdote which seems to expose the nakedness of the land. The answer consisted in the quotation of the following lines :—

Then let us pray that come it may,
 As come it will for a' that,
 That sense and worth, o'er a' the earth,
 May bear the gree, and a' that.
 For a' that, and a' that,
 It's coming yet for a' that,
 THAT MAN TO MAN, THE WARLD O'ER,
 SHALL BROTHERS BE FOR A' THAT.

The *key-note* of this fine song is,

A man's a man for a' that :

and the assertion, that, tho'

A king can make a belted knight,
 yet
 — *an honest man's aboon his might,*

is a truth which, like others more momentous, was " hid from ages and

from generations," to be revealed, in much of its power, to this glorious Scottish peasant.

In fine, what a great prophet spoke there !

Every great genius is in advance of his era. Nothing could shew more clearly how much Burns was in advance of his age, than his feelings towards *misery, as such*, whether in man, or even in fallen angel.

It would be a labour of the purest supererogation (like gilding fine gold, or painting the lily) to cite passages exhibiting Burns's fellow-feeling with the woes of his brother man. Let us see our Poet pitying the misery of *the very Devil*. The "Address to the Deil" cannot be closed without a welling out of genuinely human sympathy with the perturbed features in this fell case of unmitigated misery.

But, fare you weel, auld Nickie-ben !
O wad ye tak a thought and men' !
Ye siblins might—I dinna ken—
Still hae a stake—
I'm wae to think upo' yon den,
EV'N FOR YOUR SAKE !†

The power to feel for others' woes stopped not, however, with the highest: it descended to the lowest in the scale of sentient existences. The poet's commiseration overflows when any of the animal creation is suffering. Think only of "*poor Mailie's*" case. By the death, in a ditch (and, after all, only in an imaginary way), of this pet yowe, Burns lost "a friend and neebor dear;" and no wonder, since "she was a sheep o' sense." Think of that immortal *Mouse*: that

Wee, sleekit, cow'rin', tim'rous beastie,

With its "wee bit housie" "in ruin." Think of those "Water Fowl, in Loch-Turit," which were the bard's "fellow-creatures." Which at once recals to our remembrance, that *Mousie* had, in the ploughman, who turned "her up in her nest," a

poor earth-born companion,
And fellow-mortal !

The "wounded hare" turns his outraged compassion for the beast into a burst of indignation at the human cause of the inhuman injury.

† On the other hand, "Holy Willie's Prayer" declares, that the God of a certain sect
Sends ane to heaven and ten to hell.

So enamoured were the adherents of the sect represented to be with the love of damnation, for its own sake. Was the poet ignorant of the *true proportion*, or malignant? The proportion in the equation he gives is,

Yea, the very flowers "of the field" excite our bard's pity, when they are imagined to come to grief. Only reflect on the sad fate of that "Mountain Daisy," within whose "scanty mantle," and "sawie bosom," this universal sympathiser (worthy to be a gentle Brahman) planted, for a while, his own pitying consciousness.

But time would fail me, were I to attempt to set forth all the objects of Burns's sympathies. So I return (like the Sun, and every thing which goes round in a circle) to the point whence I started, the poem addressed "to the Deil." The entreaty to the Monarch of "yon cavern grim and sootie," that he would, "for a wee," just

let poor damned bodies be,

is not the least expressive, of the many expressions, of this genius's tender feelings, ever ready to go forth over all creation.

NOTE TO SCHOLIUM III. : NOTE E.

An ethical truth, of the profoundest nature, despite its apparent simplicity: a truth, too, of the vastest consequence. Illustrated, in the places under-noted, as it could be nowhere else; the comparison seeking its grounds in the vegetable kingdom. Matthew vii. 17; xii. 33: Luke vi. 43, 44, 45.

NOTE TO SCHOLIUM III. : NOTE F.

The man of the land of Uz was decided in maintaining, that, in the grave, "the wicked cease from troubling." (Job iii. 17.) And no native of Scotland can ever forget his National Church's metre paraphrase of that passage in the oldest book (going by the prevalent reckoning) in the most ancient of all the Books in "even the world itself." The paraphrase in question, as it originally stood, was the composition of the Reverend Robert Blair, whilom Minister of Athelstaneford, in East-Lothian, the author of "The Grave," a poem. This poem was highly prized by very good judges of blank-verse, a century ago, and more. But "The Grave" was more praised at the time than it is read now. The author of a poem on the *Grave* could not be imagined to be otherwise than of a sombre turn of mind; and in selecting the book of Job as a foundation on which to build his melancholy rhyme, he must have acted in complete accordance with his own bent, which was evidently more inclined to the grave, than to the gay, in literature, and quite possibly in life too.

But whether the poem in question be much read in our day, or no ; certain it is, that the author was, in his own day, a Scotch poet ; a poet, therefore, with that tinge of sadness,—one might almost term it melancholy,—which is to be perceived in most Scotch religious poets, and which, in one or other of its manifold forms, is so decided an ingredient in the character of Scotchmen. And so the constitutional melancholy, and the national, were afflictively united in the same personality. The national melancholiness is to be seen in the very selection of so many grave, and even dismal, themes for the Muse, when arrayed in a garb german to Scottish hearts. Of the 67 “paraphrases in verse,” which are in the exquisite collection, 7 are based upon the book of Job alone : that is, one *translation*, in every ten of the translations in the hymnal, is grounded on the most doleful book in the Bible. A genuine Scot could not be expected to refrain from introducing the sombre lines of the dirge in question.

How still and peaceful is the grave !
 Where, life's vain tumults past,
 The appointed house, by Heaven's decree,
 Receives us all at last.
The wicked there from troubling cease,
Their passions rage no more ;
 And there the weary pilgrim rests,
 From all the toils he bore.

There rest the pris'ners, now releas'd
 From slav'ry's sad abode, &c. &c. †

† Having satisfied myself, as the result of a great deal of investigation, that the Reverend Robert Blair, the author of “The Grave,” was the *original* author of the 4th *Paraphrase* ('tis understood, that it was altered—I do not say improved—by one Cameron;) I was not to be easily moved from my conviction, once entertained. The following communication was received after the Note to which this relates had been sent to the printer: but, altho' my correspondent is a person of good sense, and accustomed to the consideration of laws of evidence, still I must be allowed to say, that I remain unshaken, by this wind of information, in my opinion, formed on evidence :—

“ I have now ascertained, on reliable authority, that the 4th Paraphrase is a production of the late Michael Bruce, *altered* by Logan, of South Leith. It is, in short, one of the many plagiarisms of Logan from poor Bruce.”

It may be now added, that one of the three great religious bodies in Scotland, I mean the “United Presbyterians,” has adopted the paraphrase in question as one of the Hymns to be said or sung by the members of the body. Doubtless, the gentlemen who prepared the collection now referred to, and who unhesitatingly ascribe the Paraphrase to “Blair,” did not act without reason. U.P.s might, I acknowledge, err : as they, with much frankness, avouch that their religious ancestors did, in various difficult, and even delicate matters. Nevertheless, I cannot help thinking, that this liberal and most respectable sect did not err in this matter of authorship. It must be presumed, that *their Poetic Committee* could not go wrong on a point of such genuineness or *authenticity*.

NOTE TO SCHOLIUM III.: NOTE G.

Revelations x. 6. The words of this verse contain, as lying under the surface, the very profoundest philosophical truth. Only, the philosophic truth, at the bottom, and the superficial meaning, at the top, are very near each other.

Occasionally, indeed, there is but the one grand *Ethical* truth: no deeper truth can be imagined to exist: as holds, and emphatically holds, in the case of not a few of our Lord's utterances, especially as recorded, or occurring, in the Fourth Gospel. Take, as the sole example, John iv. 24: a finer instance there could not be, on whatever feature, in the verse, you principally fasten. The same thing is also true respecting many strictly *Theological* texts in the New Testament, and, specifically, the Epistles: (Not by any means sinking the numerous instances to be found, by any honest student seeking in earnest, throughout the Old Testament.) As examples, there may be specified the places where the Supreme Being (= He who is over all, 'Ο ων επι παντων) is described, not by means of express, far less formal, definitions, but by the indirect channel of doxologies; as Jude, verse 25,—1 Timothy i. 17, and vi. 15, 16; and numerous places besides. To which my purpose allows me to add such passages as James iv. 12, Acts xvii. 28, and many others, approaching, more or less, in character, to the nature of a strict definition.

While, in a vast number of other cases, there may be distinctly recognised a profounder philosophic truth, under the envelope of the letter. And these deeper truths, existing under the visible investment, are, again, of more kinds than one. There is, *ex. gr.*, the truth, within the words, to which we are led by the words. Call, if you like to call, this sort of truth the *Moral*, or *Spiritual*. And there is, moreover, the truth, within the words, to which we arrive not by means of the words themselves. If you please, you may call this, which is a meaning of universal import, the *true Celestial* sense, which the angels necessarily perceive. No doubt, it is not easy for any ordinary man, who is of the earth earthy or earthly, to imagine what can be meant by the angels being engaged in the study of The Bible for Jews and Christians, as a primer which the highest intelligences of the universe "desire to look into;" as, in short, a word which "is settled in the Heavens" "for ever," as being, in its inmost sense, a storehouse of celestial wisdom,

and being, too, most readily translateable into the one language of the Immortals.

NOTE TO SCHOLIUM III.: NOTE H.

“He who created, had a right to annihilate his works; and might have done so, not only to inanimate matter, and living beings destitute of reason, but also to man, prior to any promise or engagement to prolong their existence.” “Creation was a free act of power, which did not lay the Creator under an obligation to exert it for ever, or for any definite period, in upholding what he had made.” “If we reflect upon the absolute dependence of a created being upon the author of his existence,” &c., &c.†

NOTE TO SCHOLIUM III.: NOTE I.

Ex. gr., Romans ii. 12; xiv. 15. 1 Corinthians i. 18; viii. 11; xv. 18. 2 Cor. iv. 9. 2 Thessalonians, ii. 10. 2 Peter iii. 9. James iv. 12.

Here we have, at once, evidence of the familiarity, with the idea, of three of the Epistle-writers—which is another expression for the doctrine-promulgators—of the New Testament. In fact, the idea is familiar to every one of the Epistlers; to John and Jude, as well as to Peter, James, and Paul. The idea is common to men belonging to so opposite poles: to such antipodals as the beloved, and the loving, Apostle, and the Apostle characterized by vast capabilities for energetic action, as well as by his unbounded power of receptivity for highest contemplative ecstasies: him who can see nought worthy but works, and him who holds in contempt all but that vital principle which is the soul, and sole fertilizer, of sensible manifestations: to a trio of such representative individualities as Paul, Peter, James: to such a five-fold conglomeration of varying lights as Jude, John, Peter, James, Paul; typical quinquevirs like whom shall never be infolded again in any of Time's Biblicalities.

NOTE TO SCHOLIUM III: NOTE J.

Nehemiah ix. 6 may be adduced as one of those *loci classici* which declare the original, and continuous,—in short, the entire or absolute,—dependence of the creature upon the Creator. Passages to the same

† *Dick*: Vol. I., pp. 451, 452.

effect, generally, are abundant in the Bible. The words of the verse referred to are these:—“Thou, even thou, art LORD alone : thou hast made heaven, the heaven of heavens, with all their host, the earth, and all things that are therein, the seas, and all that is therein, and thou preservest them all ; and the host of heaven worshippeth thee.” The verb which is translated “preservest” is **מְחִילָה**, from **חִילָה** ; and no term could better convey the sense that JEHOVAH is (to use the words of our text) *the sole source of life to all the creatures.*



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